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ABSTRACT 
 This paper investigates the determinants of intra-year error in annual effective tax 
rate estimates, relative to the actual annual effective tax rate (“ETR Miss”) and examines 
whether ETR Miss contains value relevant information. I find that ETR Miss is affected 
by both unbiased estimation errors related to the predictability of business fundamentals 
and biased estimation related to varying managerial incentives within the year. Firms 
with higher ETR Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax earnings and earnings components, 
consistent with ETR Miss containing information on earnings quality. Finally, for firms 
with higher ETR Miss, investors place a lower weight on accounting earnings, consistent 
with the market incorporating information in ETR Miss for valuation assessments. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important accounting estimates in the preparation of financial 
reports is the estimate of income tax expense. According to U.S. GAAP, companies need 
to estimate annual effective tax rate (ETR) when determining income tax expense in the 
interim statements. 1  Firms are thus required to make four estimates of the same 
underlying annual ETR during the year.2 Assuming no behavior bias, if companies make 
good faith estimates, we would expect that over time average interim estimates of annual 
ETR should converge to year-end annual ETR. However, prior studies document a 
persistent pattern of intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, manifested by an average 
overestimation of annual ETR in interim periods. This study examines factors that 
account for the discrepancy between expected and observed annual ETR estimates. In 
addition, this study investigates whether investors appear to incorporate information 
related to ETR estimation into pricing. 
To explore why interim estimates of annual ETR do not converge to year-end 
annual ETR, I study the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, relative to the actual 
annual ETR (“ETR Miss”). Though prior literature has not studied ETR Miss directly, 
several studies have examined intra-year changes in annual ETR estimates, and have 
findings that form the basis of my study. In particular, prior studies show that the average 
effect of overestimation of annual ETR in the early quarters is associated with earnings 
                                                 
1 Estimated annual effective tax rate equals expected annual income tax expense (net of tax 
credits) divided by expected annual pre-tax earnings; firms are required to estimate annual pre-tax 
earnings and annual income tax expense on each interim date. 
2 Annual ETR estimated at the year-end is the actual annual ETR reported by the firm. 
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management incentives later in the year (Comprix et al. 2012; Cook et al. 2008; Dhaliwal 
et al. 2004).  
However, it is still unclear why firms are willing to, and able to, maintain the intra-
year error in annual ETR estimates year after year, despite the requirement of the 
accounting rule that firms should make the best estimates of annual ETR on each interim 
date, and the fact that regulators and investors can evaluate how well firms comply with 
this accounting standard by observing the realized intra-year error in annual ETR 
estimates ex post. 
Also, while prior literature shows the average effect of overestimation of annual 
ETR in the interim reports (Comprix et al. 2012), which is consistent with income-
increasing incentives later in the year, it is possible for firms to have other incentives that 
may result in underestimation of annual ETR in the interim reports;3 it is also possible for 
firms to not engage in earnings management with intra-year changes in annual ETR 
estimates, resulting in no systematic over- or under-estimation of annual ETR  in the 
interim reports. 
To fully explore all these possibilities, I develop the construct of ETR Miss to 
represent the non-directional intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, relative to the 
actual annual ETR. I study the determinants of ETR Miss to examine whether ETR Miss 
is affected by both unbiased estimation errors related to the predictability of business 
fundamentals and biased estimation related to varying managerial incentives within the 
year.  
                                                 
3 For example, when firms want to defer disclosing information about uncertain tax positions as 
much as possible. 
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ETR estimation in interim reports also provides a unique setting to study the 
implications of accounting estimates on earnings quality and the value relevance of 
accounting information. This setting is unique for two reasons. First, the estimation error 
related to interim estimates of annual ETR can be assessed precisely by financial 
statement users ex post. Second, the estimate of annual ETR in interim reports is an 
estimate all firms need to make. Utilizing this unique setting, I use ETR Miss as a proxy 
for the quality of accounting estimates, and examine whether ETR Miss is related to 
earnings quality and the value relevance of accounting information. 
I start by investigating the determinants of ETR Miss. I hypothesize that there are 
two broad reasons for ETR Miss: (i) the predictability of real economic activities and (ii) 
earnings management. For predictability, I examine whether ETR Miss is affected by 
factors that could result in deviations of ETR from the statutory rate: (i) the volatility of 
permanent differences;4 (ii) the existence of tax loss carryforward; (iii) the availability of 
R&D tax credits; and (iv) the scale of foreign operation. For earnings management, I 
examine whether ETR Miss is affected by (i) managers’ flexibility with earnings 
management to meet varying incentives within the year; (ii) firms’ general attitudes 
towards compliance with regulation; and (iii) the effectiveness of internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms in place.  
I then examine the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence by testing 
whether the persistence of pre-tax earnings and earnings components (i.e., the accrual and 
                                                 
4 My proxy for permanent differences is a broad proxy that not only includes pure permanent 
differences per se, but also includes the effects of tax credits and foreign-sourced earnings for 
ETR to deviate from the statutory rate. See Section 5.1 Research Design for Determinants of ETR 
Miss for detailed discussion on the proxy for permanent differences. 
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cash flow components of pre-tax earnings) change with the level of ETR Miss. Earnings 
persistence is the chosen attribute of earnings quality in my study because like ETR Miss, 
earnings persistence is determined internally by both business fundamentals and 
managerial discretion. Further, I investigate the consequence of ETR Miss on the value 
relevance of accounting information by testing whether the weight investors place on 
accounting earnings change with the level of ETR Miss.  
Consistent with my hypothesis that ETR Miss is affected by factors from both the 
predictability dimension and the earnings management dimension, I find ETR Miss is 
increasing in the volatility of permanent differences, the existence of tax loss 
carryforward, the availability of R&D tax credit, the scale of foreign operations, firms’ 
tax aggressiveness, the existence of internal control weakness, and the existence of 
earnings restatement, and ETR Miss is decreasing in the strength of corporate 
governance.5 
Consistent with information in ETR Miss about the quality of accounting estimates 
indicating the quality of accounting earnings, I find that firms with higher ETR Miss 
(indicating lower quality accounting estimates) exhibit less persistent pre-tax earnings 
and earnings components (indicating lower quality accounting earnings). I also find that 
                                                 
5 Further analysis of effect size suggests that the scale of foreign operations is the single most 
important contributor to the explained variance of ETR Miss, where the proportion of the total 
variance of ETR Miss attributed to the effect of the scale of foreign operations is 2%. The 
proportion of the total variance attributed to the other six earnings management proxies combined 
(i.e., tax aggressiveness, financial reporting aggressiveness, the strength of corporate governance, 
auditor provided tax services, internal control weakness, and earnings restatement) is 1%; while 
the proportion of the total variance attributed to the other three predictability proxies combined 
(i.e., the volatility of permanent difference, tax loss carryforward, and R&D tax credit) is 0.3%. 
For comparison, the proportion of the total variance explained by the model is 6%. 
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for firms with higher ETR Miss, investors place a lower weight on accounting earnings, 
consistent with ETR Miss containing information relevant for market valuation. 
My study makes three contributions. First, my study examines the intra-year error 
in annual ETR estimates, a property of the ETR that is missing from prior literature. I 
specifically construct a broad measure of permanent differences to proxy for factors that 
result in deviations of the ETR from the statutory tax rate (i.e., earnings taxed at non-
statutory tax rate due to permanent differences, tax credits, and foreign-sourced earnings). 
My results show that ETR Miss is positively associated with the volatility of permanent 
differences. 
Second, building on and adding to the literature on earnings management through 
tax accounts, I find ETR Miss is affected by both unbiased estimation errors related to the 
predictability of business fundamentals and biased estimation related to varying 
managerial incentives within the year.  
Third, my study contributes to the literature on the impact of accounting estimates 
on earnings quality and value relevance. In particular, my results show ETR Miss, as a 
proxy for the quality of accounting estimates, indicates the quality of accounting earnings 
(earnings persistence in particular), and the market incorporates the information in ETR 
Miss into its valuation of accounting information. 
Section 2 provides institutional background of annual ETR estimation on interim 
dates, as required by the integral method under GAAP. Section 3 reviews prior research 
and proposes a thorough study of ETR Miss to represent the non-directional intra-year 
error in annual ETR estimates, relative to the actual annual ETR. I develop specific 
  6 
hypotheses regarding the determinants and consequences of ETR Miss after explaining 
its economic meaning. Section 4 provides the operationalization of ETR Miss by defining 
the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric, and describes the sample. Section 5 presents the research design, 
descriptive statistics, and empirical results regarding the determinants of ETR Miss. 
Section 6 presents results regarding the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings 
persistence. Section 7 presents results regarding the consequence of ETR Miss on the 
value relevance of accounting information. Section 8 discusses results for supplemental 
analyses using quarterly data. Section 9 presents results for robustness check. Section 10 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. GAAP Relating to Annual ETR Estimation on Interim Dates 
U.S. GAAP requires the adoption of the integral method for determining expenses 
(e.g., income tax expenses) in interim reporting (i.e., financial reporting for periods 
shorter than one year). The integral method requires that firms estimate expense for the 
entire year, and then allocate the annual expense to the current period on a pro rata basis.   
In the case of income tax expense, ASC 740 - Income Taxes,6 requires that on each 
interim date, firms make their best estimates of the ETR expected to be applicable for the 
entire fiscal year, after consideration of anticipated annual tax credits, foreign tax rates, 
and other tax planning alternatives. Firms should then apply the estimated annual ETR to 
their year-to-date ordinary pre-tax income to determine the year-to-date (YTD) income 
tax expense. The current period (i.e., the 3-month current quarter) income tax expense is 
                                                 
6  ASC 740 codifies accounting rules previously stated in APB Opinion No. 28 and its 
interpretation, FIN No. 18 regarding the integral method for interim tax reporting. 
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calculated by subtracting prior period YTD income tax expense from the current period 
YTD income tax expense. In other words, an annual effective tax rate is estimated on 
each interim date, and current period income tax expense is backed out using this 
estimated annual effective tax rate. 
The above general rule applies to ordinary pre-tax income (i.e., income from 
continuing operations excluding unusual or infrequent items), while income tax expense 
related to unusual or infrequent items need to be reported using the discrete method as an 
exception to the general rule (i.e., income tax estimates for significant unusual or 
infrequent items are based on current period results only, independent of the annual ETR 
estimate).7, 8 
In sum, under GAAP, firms need to perform the following procedures for making 
income tax provisions in interim reports: (i) estimate the annual ETR for the entire year, 
given information available on the interim dates about the entire year’s economic 
outcomes and tax planning strategies; (ii) apply the estimated annual ETR to YTD pre-
tax ordinary income to determine YTD income tax expense for ordinary income; (iii) 
subtract prior period YTD income tax expense for ordinary income from current period 
YTD income tax expense to get current period income tax expense for ordinary income; 
(iv) estimate income tax expense associated with infrequent or unusual items from 
                                                 
7  Similarly, income tax expenses associated with items reported net of tax effects (e.g., 
discontinued operations or extraordinary items) are also estimated using the discrete method, 
though their associated tax expenses are not part of the reported income tax expense (i.e., these 
items do not affect the ETR estimation), and thus should not affect my analysis of intra-year error 
in annual ETR estimates.  
8 To account for this exception, I exclude firm-years with special items in robustness check; as 
shown in robustness check, inferences remain the same after the exclusion. 
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continuing operations for the current period; (v) add the result from (iv) to the result from 
(iii) to get total income tax expense for the current period. 
 
3. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
3.1     Intra-Year Error in Annual ETR Estimates: The Construct of ETR Miss 
3.1.1     Prior Research on Overestimation of Annual ETR in Interim Reports 
Prior research shows an overestimation of annual ETR in interim reports. In 
particular, prior study documents that on average, annual ETR estimates start high in Q1, 
and then decrease monotonically in Q2, Q3, and Q4 (Comprix et al. 2012).  
Explaining the average effect of overestimation of annual ETR in the early quarters, 
researchers have linked intra-year changes in annual ETR estimates with earnings 
management incentives. In particular, prior studies find that firms use intra-year changes 
in annual ETR estimates to meet earnings targets in annual and interim reports: firms 
manipulate annual ETR estimates to meet analyst earnings forecasts that they would 
otherwise have missed without the manipulation (Comprix et al. 2012; Cook et al. 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2004).9 
 
3.1.2     The Economic Meaning of the Construct of ETR Miss 
Based on prior research that shows an average effect of overestimation of annual 
                                                 
9 These studies are consistent with the literature that shows managers have incentives to beat 
benchmarks (Dechow and Skinner 2000), where analyst forecast is a more important benchmark 
than losses or earnings decrease (Brown and Caylor 2005), and firms are rewarded by the market 
for beating analyst forecast (Bartov et al. 2002; Dopuch et al. 2007; Jiang 2008; Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). 
  9 
ETR in the interim periods, it is interesting to see why firms are willing to, and able to, 
maintain a persistent pattern of intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, as this observed 
pattern seems in violation of the accounting rule. I propose a thorough study of the intra-
year error in annual ETR estimates, relative to the actual annual ETR, to better 
understand firm behaviors regarding accounting estimates, earnings quality, and the value 
relevance of accounting information. I term the construct of the intra-year error in annual 
ETR estimates “ETR Miss”, and use this term throughout the discussions below. 
Representing the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates relative to the actual 
annual ETR, the construct of ETR Miss has two key dimensions: (i) the predictability of 
real economic activities that result in deviations of ETR from the statutory rate, which 
could affect the variability of unbiased ETR estimates within the year; and (ii) the intra-
year variability of managerial incentives, which could result in manipulated ETR 
estimates, and thus the variability of the biased ETR estimates within the year.  
The variability of the observed ETR estimates results from the interplay of forces 
from both dimensions. In my analysis, I start with the most basic case where both 
dimensions are fixed; and then proceed to analyze each dimension separately, holding the 
other dimension constant. 
When both dimensions remain fixed within the year, i.e., if (i) managers are able to 
perfectly predict pre-tax earnings and income tax expenses for the entire year on all 
interim dates; and (ii) managers do not manipulate annual ETR estimates to meet varying 
incentives at different time of the year, assuming no behavioral bias, there should be 
  10 
minimum variation in annual ETR estimates within the year (or equivalently, across the 
different interim dates), resulting in low ETR Miss.  
When only the first dimension is allowed to change while the second dimension is 
fixed, (i.e., if managers make unbiased estimation), then ETR Miss solely depends on the 
predictability of real economic activities.10 When this is the case, higher predictability 
will lead to lower ETR Miss, and lower predictability will lead to higher ETR Miss.  
When only the second dimension is allowed to change while the first dimension is 
fixed (i.e., if real economic activities are perfectly predictable within the year, but 
managers face varying incentives at different time of the year, and managers manipulate 
annual ETR estimates in response to the varying incentives), then ETR Miss depends on 
the variability of incentives and the actual manipulations through annual ETR estimates 
within the year. For example, firms could purposefully set a high annual ETR estimate at 
the beginning of the fiscal year, so that they could lower it when they need to boost after-
tax earnings later in the year.11, 12 In the sense that higher variability allows managers 
more freedom to manipulate after-tax earnings to suit varying incentives at different time 
                                                 
10 Real economic activities resulting in earnings taxed at non-statutory rate directly affect ETR 
and ETR Miss, while real economic activities resulting in earnings taxed at the statutory rate 
indirectly affect ETR and ETR Miss, as ETR is the weighted average of the two types of 
earnings. 
11 This example is consistent with the empirical evidence in prior studies for (the average effect of 
the) overestimation of annual ETR in the interim periods, where the overestimation is instilled for 
income-increasing incentives (i.e., to meeting analyst forecasts) later in the year. 
12 Alternatively, firms could also purposefully set a low annual ETR estimate at the beginning of 
the year, to defer disclosing information about uncertain tax positions from the tax authority as 
much as possible. 
  11 
of the year, higher manipulation will lead to higher ETR Miss, and lower manipulation 
will lead to lower ETR Miss.13, 14 
When both dimensions are allowed to change, ETR Miss depends on the dominant 
forces at play. 
In sum, the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, captures both (i) 
firms’ ability to make unbiased accounting estimates and (ii) firms’ earnings management 
activities in response to varying incentives within the year. 
 
3.2     Hypotheses Regarding Determinants of ETR Miss 
In accordance with the two dimensions of the construct of ETR Miss, I discuss two 
sets of hypotheses regarding the determinants of ETR Miss: one set of determinants that 
affect ETR Miss through predictability, and the other set that affects ETR Miss through 
earnings management. 
 
3.2.1     Determinants Affecting ETR Miss through Predictability  
Assuming unbiased estimation, managers of firms with more predictable business 
fundamentals are better able to estimate economic outcomes; in this case, intra-year error 
in annual ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, should be low. In other words, predictability is 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with ETR Miss.  
                                                 
13 Or equivalently, higher ETR Miss allows for (indicates) higher manipulation, and lower ETR 
Miss allows for (indicates) lower manipulation. 
14 It is possible that higher manipulation could lead to lower ETR Miss if managers see lower 
ETR Miss as an incentive goal on and of itself. However, since there is no particular reason why 
managers would set low ETR Miss as a goal in the presence of other incentives such as meeting 
analysts forecasts, I judge this possibility as unlikely. 
  12 
To further analyze the impact of predictability on ETR Miss, I discuss four factors 
through which predictability could affect ETR Miss: (i) permanent differences, which is 
the main driver causing deviation of ETR from the statutory rate; the volatility of 
permanent differences decreases the predictability of ETR and thus increases ETR Miss; 
(ii) tax loss carryforward, which could result in deviation of ETR from the statutory rate 
when firms cannot generate enough future profits to realize the tax benefit associated 
with the loss carryforward within the loss carryforward period of 20 years; the existence 
of tax loss carryforward requires predicting profitability in the long-term, which adds to 
the difficulty of predicting annual ETR and thus increases ETR Miss; (iii) economic 
activities eligible for R&D tax credit, which results in deviation of ETR from the 
statutory rate as tax credits reduce ETR; the availability of R&D tax credit decreases the 
predictability of ETR and thus increases ETR Miss; and (iv) foreign-sourced earnings 
that are designated as “permanently reinvested”; ETR is the weighted average of foreign 
and domestic income tax rates; the scale of foreign operations adds to the difficulty of 
predicting annual ETR and thus increases ETR Miss.15  
Stated formally (in alternative form), I hypothesize the following relationship 
between ETR Miss and its determinants through the predictability dimension (the 
predictability hypothesis). 
H1a: Through the predictability dimension, other things equal, ETR Miss is 
increasing in the volatility of permanent differences, the existence of tax 
loss carryforward, the availability of R&D tax credit, and the scale of 
foreign operations.  
 
                                                 
15 I discuss specific proxies for each of the four factors in Section 5.1 Research Design for 
Determinants of ETR Miss. 
  13 
3.2.2     Determinants Affecting ETR Miss through Earnings Management  
Assuming biased estimation, managers respond to varying managerial incentives 
within the year by manipulating annual ETR estimates. The more variable managerial 
incentives are within the year, the more likely it is for managers to manipulate annual 
ETR estimates as a last resort to meet the varying incentives at different time of the year; 
in this case, intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, should be high. In 
other words, earnings management is hypothesized to be positively associated with ETR 
Miss.16  
To further analyze the impact of earnings management on ETR Miss, I discuss three 
classes of forces that may influence such impact: (i) managers’ flexibility with actual 
manipulation of annual ETR estimates to meet varying incentives at different time of the 
year, which increases ETR Miss; (ii) firms’ general attitudes towards compliance with 
regulations, which may strengthen (with aggressive attitudes) or constrain (with 
conservative attitudes) managers’ actual manipulation of annual ETR estimates within the 
year, and thus increase or decrease ETR Miss, respectively; and (iii) the effectiveness of 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms in place, which may strengthen (with 
ineffective monitoring) or constrain (with effective monitoring) managers’ actual 
                                                 
16  The hypothesized positive relationship between ETR Miss and earnings management is 
partially supported by the empirical evidence in prior research that shows firms boost earnings by 
decreasing annual ETR estimates when they would have missed analyst earnings forecasts 
otherwise (Comprix et al. 2012; Cook et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2004). 
  14 
manipulation of annual ETR estimates within the year, and thus increase or decease ETR 
Miss, respectively.17   
Stated formally (in alternative form), I hypothesize the following relationship 
between ETR Miss and its determinants through the earnings management dimension 
(the earnings management hypothesis). 
H1b: Through the earnings management dimension, other things equal, ETR 
Miss is increasing in managers’ flexibility with earnings management and 
firms’ aggressiveness towards compliance with regulations, and ETR Miss 
is decreasing in the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in place. 
 
3.3     Hypotheses Regarding Consequences of ETR Miss: Earnings Persistence 
A direct consequence of intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, is 
one on earnings quality, of which earnings persistence is a commonly studied attribute 
because of its importance in both the conceptual framework of accounting standards, and 
in the Ohlson (1995) valuation model (Barth and Hutton 2004; Jonas and Blanchet 2000). 
Earnings persistence is an especially relevant attribute of earnings quality for assessing 
the information content of ETR Miss because like ETR Miss, earnings persistence is 
determined internally by both business fundamentals and managerial discretion.  
 
3.3.1     Prior Research on Accounting/Tax Choices and Earnings Persistence 
Prior research has investigated whether certain properties of accounting and tax 
choices contain information relevant for the persistence of firms’ pre-tax earnings and 
                                                 
17 I discuss proxies for the specific channels through which earnings management could affect 
ETR Miss under each class of forces in Section 5.1 Research Design for Determinants of ETR 
Miss. 
  15 
earnings components. In particular, Hanlon (2005) hypothesizes and finds that firm-years 
with large book-tax differences have earnings that are less persistent than firm-years with 
small book-tax differences. Following Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al. (2012) provide 
further evidence that positive book-tax differences arising from earnings management 
exhibit less persistent earnings while positive book-tax differences arising from tax 
avoidance exhibit more persistent earnings. McGuire et al. (2013) hypothesize and find 
that firms-years with more sustainable tax strategies have earnings that are more 
persistent than firm-years with less sustainable tax strategies.  
 
3.3.2     Hypotheses Regarding ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
The information content in ETR Miss for indicating earnings persistence differs 
from that in other tax measures used in prior studies such as book-tax differences and the 
sustainability of tax strategies, because ETR Miss contains unique information about the 
predictability of business fundamentals and earnings management; while book-tax 
differences or the sustainability of tax strategies do not contain such information. In 
addition, while both book-tax differences and the sustainability of tax strategies are 
subject to the effects of tax planning, the impact of tax planning on ETR Miss is kept to 
the minimum.18, 19  
                                                 
18  In particular, book-tax differences result from current year accounting discretion and tax 
planning; the sustainability of tax strategies results from long term tax planning; and ETR Miss 
mainly results from current year accounting discretion.  
19 The impact of tax planning on ETR Miss is kept to the minimum because the accounting 
standard requires firms to make the best estimates of annual ETR after consideration of available 
tax planning strategies for the entire year on each interim date; under the reasonable assumption 
that tax planning strategies take a relatively long time to implement (Schmidt 2006), and firms 
should have information about their current year tax planning strategies at the beginning of the 
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Building on Dichev and Tang (2009), who point out the persistence of earnings is 
the result of both economic and accounting factors, I propose that because the two 
dimensions (i.e., predictability and earnings management) of intra-year error in annual 
ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, correspond to such economic and accounting factors, ETR 
Miss contains unique information relevant for assessing the persistence of firms’ pre-tax 
earnings and earnings components.  
In particular, the predictability dimension of ETR Miss (assuming unbiased 
estimation) indicates a negative association between ETR Miss and earnings persistence 
because: (i) higher ETR Miss indicates less predictable earnings (as discussed in Section 
3.2.1);20 and (ii) less predictable earnings (indicating firms’ economic fundamentals from 
investment and operations) are less persistent (Dichev and Tang 2009). In the meantime, 
the earnings management dimension of ETR Miss (assuming biased estimation) also 
indicates a negative association between ETR Miss and earnings persistence because: (i) 
higher ETR Miss indicates more highly manipulated earnings (as discussed in Section 
3.2.2) and (ii) more highly manipulated earnings (indicating firms’ financial reporting 
biases) are less persistent (Dichev and Tang 2009). In sum, ETR Miss is negatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
current year, difference in tax planning should be kept to the minimum for the same firm within 
the year. As a result, intra-year error in annual ETR estimates (i.e., ETR Miss) is less likely to 
result from changes in tax planning within the year. On the other hand, tax planning could affect 
ETR Miss to the extent that managers cannot anticipate it on interim dates; given the accounting 
rule that requires firms to estimate annual ETR based on all anticipated tax planning strategies for 
the entire year, better compliance with this accounting rule implies more predictable tax planning.  
20 Previous discussion on determinants of ETR Miss focuses on how predictability affects ETR 
Miss through earnings taxed at non-statutory rate. However, under the assumption that the 
predictability of income taxed at non-statutory rate is positively associated with the predictability 
of pre-tax income in general, the information content in ETR Miss also indicates the 
predictability of business fundamentals in general. 
  17 
associated with earnings persistence because (i) less predictable earnings are less 
persistent; or (ii) more highly manipulated earnings are less persistent; or both. 
To the extent that ETR Miss relates to the subjectivity of accounting accruals, the 
above prediction (for the relationship between ETR Miss and earnings persistence) 
should apply to the accruals component of earnings. Alternatively, to the extent that ETR 
Miss (partially) relates to realized accounting earnings, the above prediction should apply 
to the cash flow component of earnings. 
Stated formally (in alternative form), I hypothesize the following relationship 
between ETR Miss and the persistence of pre-tax earnings and earnings components. 
H2a: Pre-tax earnings persistence decreases with ETR Miss. 
 
H2b: The persistence of the accruals component of earnings decreases with 
ETR Miss. 
 




3.4     Hypotheses Regarding Consequences of ETR Miss: Value Relevance 
Accounting information is an essential input for the capital market. Whether ETR 
Miss contains information relevant for market valuation is an important question for users 
of the financial statements. The answer to this question depends on two premises: (i) 
whether ETR Miss contains information on earnings quality, and (ii) whether the market 
deciphers and incorporates the information in ETR Miss (on earnings quality) for 
valuation assessment.  
If ETR Miss indicates earnings quality (i.e., if the hypothesized relationship 
between ETR Miss and earnings persistence holds), then in an efficient market, the 
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implication of ETR Miss on value relevance depends on whether the information in ETR 
Miss is substantial enough to make a difference for market valuation.21 The difficulty of 
understanding tax-related information by market participants may hinder the actual use of 
potentially useful information, as evidenced in prior literature: Plumlee (2003) finds that 
financial analysts are unable to forecast the effects of complex tax law changes; and 
Weber (2009) finds that both investors and analysts fail to correctly incorporate 
information in book-tax differences into their earnings expectations. Thus it is an 
empirical question whether the market can correctly decipher information in ETR Miss 
for valuation purposes. If the information in ETR Miss is correctly deciphered by market 
participants, and deemed to be incrementally useful, then the market will incorporate 
such information for valuation assessment; in this case, market valuation of earnings 
should change with ETR Miss. 
If ETR Miss contains information incrementally useful for valuation purposes, and 
the market incorporates the information in ETR Miss, the valuation of accounting 
earnings will be consistent with such information. In particular, if ETR Miss indicates 
lower quality accounting earnings (the negative relationship between ETR Miss and 
earnings persistence as discussed in Section 3.3), then investors may attach a lower 
weight to earnings associated with higher ETR Miss. In other words, the market valuation 
of accounting earnings should be negatively associated with ETR Miss.  
Stated formally (in alternative form), I hypothesize the following relationship 
between ETR Miss and the value relevance of accounting earnings.  
                                                 
21 I rely on prior literature for the efficient market hypothesis to make the claim that incrementally 
useful information is incorporated by the market for valuation purposes. 
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H3: Market valuation of earnings decreases with ETR Miss. 
 
 
4. Measuring ETR Miss 
4.1     Development of the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 Metric 
I measure the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, relative to the actual annual 
ETR, or the construct of ETR Miss, using the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric, which is defined using an 
adapted version of the coefficient of variation of the annual ETR estimates made on the 
three interim dates of the year. Consistent with prior literature that uses the coefficient of 
variation as a unitless measure of variability (Albrecht and Richardson 1990; Michelson 
et al. 1995; Minton and Schrand 1999; Minton et al. 2002), the unadapted coefficient of 
variation of the annual ETR estimates (𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉) is the standard deviation of the four 
annual ETR estimates made during the year scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
annual ETR estimates over the same period. 22  
To better address my research question, I modify the coefficient of variation by 
replacing the mean annual ETR estimates during the year with the actual annual ETR at 






, where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑞  is annual ETR 
estimated on each of the three interim dates,23 defined as total year-to-date income tax 
                                                 








, where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑞 is annual ETR estimated 
at each quarter end (four estimates in a given year), defined as total year-to-date income tax 
expense divided by total year-to-date pre-tax earnings (𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑌𝑡𝑞/𝑃𝐼𝑌𝑡𝑞).  
23 In the main test, I do not require the availability of annual ETR estimates on all three interim 
dates for a firm-year to be included in the sample (i.e., 𝑁  could be equal to 1, 2 or 3 for 
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expense divided by total year-to-date pre-tax earnings (𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑌𝑡𝑞/𝑃𝐼𝑌𝑡𝑞 ); and 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑦  is 
actual annual ETR at the year-end, defined as annual income tax expense divided by 
annual pre-tax earnings (𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑡/𝑃𝐼𝑡).
24 Higher value of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 indicates higher intra-
year error in annual ETR estimates.  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 is a better measure than 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 because of the superiority of the actual 
annual ETR at the year-end over mean annual ETR estimates within the year as a 
benchmark to evaluate the intra-year error of annual ETR estimates. In particular, the 
superiority is due to three reasons: (i) GAAP requires firms to make their best estimate of 
annual ETR on each interim date; actual annual ETR at the year-end is an easily 
observable benchmark for financial statement users to evaluate how well firms comply 
with this accounting rule; (ii) actual annual ETR at the year-end is estimated with more 
complete information available to estimate firms’ economic outcomes; also, uncertainties 
regarding tax regulations are more likely to be resolved near the year-end as updated 
guidance or legislation may be available from the tax authorities at that time; and (iii) 
                                                                                                                                                 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠; 𝑁 could be equal to 2, 3, or 4 for 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉). I require the availability of annual ETR 
estimates on all three interim dates as an alternative sample selection criterion in robustness 
check. As shown in robustness check, inferences remain the same with this alternative sample 
selection criterion. 
24 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑞 (year-to-date ETR, or expected annual ETR estimated on each interim date, obtained 
from Compustat Quarterly) at the end of Q4 should be the same as 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑦 (actual annual ETR at 
the year-end, obtained from Compustat Annual). However, 9% of my sample shows a difference 
between the two, though the differences often have small magnitude. By comparing Compustat 
reported numbers for pre-tax earnings and income tax expense with those in SEC filings for a 
small sample of firms, I find that Compustat Annual results are correct 80% of the time, while 
Compustat Quarterly results (Q4 year-to-date results) are correct 20% of the time. I thus use 
Compustat Annual results for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric in the main test, with two related robustness 
checks: (i) using Compustat Quarterly results (Q4 year-to-date results) as the year-end results; 
and (ii) excluding firm-years with a difference between the two. As shown in robustness check, 
inferences remain the same with these alternative definitions of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠.  
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actual annual ETR at the year-end has the additional assurance provided by auditors, 
which could add to its accuracy and credibility.25 
 
4.2     Sample Selection 
I conduct empirical tests for determinants and consequences of ETR Miss using a 
sample of U.S. firms over 1993-2012 with available annual and quarterly data on 
Compustat and price data on CRSP.26  
Table 1 Panel A describes the sample selection. I start with 184,098 firm-year 
observations of all U.S. companies listed in Compustat Annual Database. Following 
Comprix et al. (2012) and Hanlon (2005), I then apply the following exclusion criteria: 
exclusion of 67,238 firm-year observations with negative pretax income, negative ETRs, 
or ETRs above 1; exclusion of 16,316 firm-year observations in the financial services 
industry, with SICs 6726, 6792, 6795, 6798, and 6799; exclusion of 30,170 firm-year 
observations with missing price data from CRSP; and exclusion of 8,817 firm-year 
observations with missing data on the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  metric computed from Compustat 
Quarterly Database. This leaves me with 61,557 firm-year observations with data 
available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric in the main sample.27 
                                                 
25 Despite the advantages of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 over 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉, I use 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 as an alternative measure 
for ETR Miss, to mitigate the concern that actual annual ETR at the year-end could be 
manipulated and thus may not be a good benchmark. Inferences remain the same using this 
alternative measure, as shown in robustness check.  
26  Consistent with Hanlon (2005), I choose 1993 as the starting year because of the 
implementation of ASC 740 (formerly SFAS No. 109) in 1993, which significantly changed the 
accounting for income taxes. 
27 In later sections the main sample is reduced due to data availability for additional variables 
required for the respective tests. A reconciliation of sample selection between the main sample 
and the samples used in the particular tests is presented in each section. 
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Table 1 Panel B (Panel C) presents the industry (annual) sample distribution; there 
is no evidence of clustering. 
 [Table 1] 
 
4.3     Descriptive Statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 Metric 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric in the main sample. 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the four annual ETR estimates made during the 
year (one estimate at each quarter-end) and the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  metric. The descriptive 
statistics is consistent with prior study that shows a monotonically decreasing trend of 
annual ETR estimated from Q1 to Q4 (Comprix et al. 2012).28, 29  
Table 2 Panel B presents sample distribution by intra-year ETR trend. Three intra-
year ETR trends (for annual ETR estimated from Q1 to Q4) are presented: (i) 
monotonically increasing (MI); (ii) monotonically decreasing (MD); and (iii) fluctuating 
(FL). Different from the average effect of the monotonically decreasing trend shown in 
prior literature, the majority of firm-years show fluctuating rather than strictly 
monotonically decreasing intra-year trend. In particular, 10.5% (or 5,054 out of 48,255) 
of all firm-years (with data available for annual ETR for all four quarters) fall in the MI 
group; 17.5% (or 8,438 out of 48,255) of all firm-years fall in the MD group; and 72.0% 
(or 34,763 out of 48,255) of all firm-years fall in the FL group.  
                                                 
28 Consistent with prior study (Comprix et al. 2012), t-test results show mean Q1 annual ETR 
estimate is higher than mean Q2 annual ETR estimate; mean Q2 annual ETR estimate is higher 
than mean Q3 annual ETR estimate; mean Q3 annual ETR estimate is higher than mean Q4 
annual ETR estimate; and mean Q4 annual ETR estimate is lower than mean Q1 annual ETR 
estimate, all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
29 I use Q4 estimate of annual ETR interchangeably with actual annual ETR at the year-end. 
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This observation is even more salient when the distribution is based on unique firms 
instead of firm-years. Specifically, 4.0% (or 280 out of 7,003) of all firms fall in the MI 
group; 5.5% (or 382 out of 7,003) of all firms fall in the MD group; and 90.5% (or 6,341 
out of 7,003) of all firms fall in the FL group.30 The fact that the majority of firms show 
fluctuating annual ETR estimates during the year confirms the importance of examining 
the non-directional intra-year error in annual ETR estimates as a broader construct than 
the directional changes in intra-year annual ETR estimates; in addition, this fact shows 
preliminary evidence for either the difficulty of estimating annual ETR on interim dates, 
or the existence of varying managerial incentives during the year that results in 
manipulation of annual ETR to achieve after-tax earnings goal at different time of the 
year. 
Table 2 Panel C presents the frequency distribution of repeated firm behaviors 
under each of the three intra-year ETR trends: MI, MD, and FL, where the intra-year 
trend is defined for firm-years; the number of repeated behaviors is the maximum number 
of years the same firm falls into a given intra-year ETR trend during my sample period of 
1993-2012; and the frequency distribution is the number of firms exhibiting the 
corresponding maximum number of repeated behaviors in my sample. The MI group 
shows up to 8 years of repeated MI trend by the same firms; the MD group shows up to 
12 years of repeated MD trend by the same firms; and the FL group shows up to 18 years 
of repeated FL trend by the same firms. 
                                                 
30 A given firm may fall into MI, MD, or FL in different years. A firm is classified into an intra-
year trend if the majority of years of the same firm fall into a particular intra-year trend; firms are 
excluded from the firm distribution if the majority of years of the same firms do not fall into any 
of the three intra-year trends. 
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Table 2 Panel D presents descriptive statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric by intra-year 
ETR trend, where the intra-year trends are defined for firm-years. The MD group has 
higher mean and median values of the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric (mean of 0.259; median of 0.054) 
than the MI group (mean of 0.129; median of 0.049) and the FL group (mean of 0.160; 
median of 0.036), respectively. Table 2 Panel E shows the difference in means and 
medians between the groups are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2 Panel F presents results on the persistence of ETR Miss. In particular, time 
series regression is estimated when current year 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  is regressed on prior one 
year’s 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 (the first column), or prior two years’ 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 (the second column). 
The coefficient on 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡−1 is significantly positive (0.140, t-stat = 16.39 from the 
one year model; 0.122, t-stat = 11.52 from the two-year model),31 consistent with ETR 
Miss being persistent. 
The persistence of ETR Miss is consistent with prior study that documents the 
persistent overestimation of annual ETR in the interim reports (manifested by the 
monotonically decreasing intra-year ETR trend) as an average effect. However, taken 
together with the evidence that the majority of firms have different patterns of intra-year 
ETR trend (i.e., fluctuating or monotonically increasing), the persistence of ETR Miss 
suggests that although not exhibited in the average effect, these other patterns of intra-
year ETR trend are also persistent and are worth investigating. 
[Table 2] 
 
                                                 
31 The coefficient on 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡−2 is also significantly positive (0.087, t-stat = 8.98) from the 
two-year model. 
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5. Determinants of ETR Miss 
5.1     Research Design for Determinants of ETR Miss 
I investigate the determinants of ETR Miss by testing the two hypotheses in 
accordance with the economic meaning of ETR Miss: (i) the predictability hypothesis, 
and (ii) the earnings management hypothesis. I describe specific proxies for testing each 
hypothesis below. 
 
5.1.1     Proxies for Testing the Predictability Hypothesis 
Previous discussion posits a negative association between ETR Miss and 
predictability in general, and positive associations between ETR Miss and each of the 
four predictability factors in particular: (i) the volatility of permanent differences; (ii) the 
existence of tax loss carryforward; (iii) the availability of R&D tax credit; and (iv) the 
scale of foreign operations. I discuss specific proxies for the four factors in detail below. 
 
The Volatility of Permanent Differences 
Permanent book-tax differences (PD) is a main source that could cause ETR to 
deviate from the statutory rate.32 Unlike temporary book-tax differences (TD) such as 
accelerated depreciation expense that only affects cash tax outflows but does not affect 
tax accruals (since the effect of TD is included in deferred tax expense/benefit, which is a 
component of total income tax expense), PD not only affects cash tax outflows, but also 
affects tax accruals (as the effect of PD never enters income statement through income 
                                                 
32 Two other major sources that could cause deviation of ETR from the statutory rate are: (i) tax 
credits, and (ii) foreign-sourced earnings. Both are explained in detail below. 
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tax expense).33, 34 As a result, TD does not make ETR different from the statutory rate, 
while PD makes ETR different from the statutory rate. 
Because PD affects ETR, the predictability of PD affects the predictability of 
annual ETR estimates within the year. As prior literature shows that more volatile 
business outcomes are harder to predict (Dichev and Tang 2009; Duru and Reeb 2002), 
the volatility of PD is hypothesized to be negatively associated with predictability and 
positively associated with ETR Miss.  
Empirically, I proxy for PD using pre-tax income minus the difference between 
total income tax expense and state income tax expense divided by statutory rate. 
Specifically, 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝐼 − (𝑇𝑋𝑇 − 𝑇𝑋𝑆 − 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆)/0.35, where 𝑃𝐼 is pre-tax book income; 
𝑇𝑋𝑇 is total income tax expense, 𝑇𝑋𝑆 is current state income tax expense; and 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆 is 
deferred state income tax expense, all available from Compustat. I define the PD proxy in 
                                                 
33 Examples of income that lead to permanent differences (i.e., non-taxable income) include: (1) 
interest from municipal bonds; (2) life insurance proceeds; and (3) dividends received from other 
corporations that qualify for the dividends received deduction (if the ownership is less than 20% 
of the investee's shares outstanding, then 70% of the income is not taxable; if ownership is 
between 20% and 80%, then 80% of the income is not taxable; if ownership is over 80%, then 
100% of the dividends received are not taxable). Examples of expense that lead to permanent 
differences (i.e., expenses that are not tax deductible) include: (1) 50% of business meals and 
entertainment; (2) bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal payments; (3) lobbying and other political 
expenses; (4) premiums paid on life insurance policies; and (5) fines and penalties. 
34 Although employee stock options could result in book-tax difference that never reverses, it 
does not result in permanent differences, because the excess tax benefit (i.e., tax benefit on 
exercise date, when in excess of the deferred tax asset created at grant date) is credited to 
additional paid in capital, rather than enter the income statement. This conclusion holds under 
both prior and current accounting regimes for employee stock options: (i) the APB Opinion No. 
25 regime, issued in Oct 1972, which adopts the intrinsic value method that essentially does not 
require expensing of employee stock options; (ii) the FAS 123 regime, issued in Oct. 1995 
(effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1995), which encourages expensing of 
stock employee options using the fair value method, but still allows APB No. 25 election with 
note disclosure; and (iii) the FAS 123R regime (now codified within ASC 718), issued in March 
2004 (effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2005 for most public companies), which 
requires expensing of employee stock option using the fair value method and eliminates the 
intrinsic value method required under APB No. 25 and allowed under FAS 123. 
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this way because the difference between pre-tax income and PD multiplied by statutory 
tax rate plus state income tax expense is total income tax expense: (𝑃𝐼 − 𝑃𝐷) ∗ 0.35 +
𝑇𝑋𝑆 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆 = 𝑇𝑋𝑇.35 
My PD proxy is a broad proxy that not only captures the effects of “pure” 
permanent differences, but also captures the effects of tax credits and foreign-sourced 
earnings on ETR.36, 37 In particular, I keep the effects of tax credit and foreign-sourced 
earnings on ETR in my broad PD proxy for two reasons: (i) though not being part of PD 
per se, tax credits and foreign-sourced earnings also cause deviation of ETR from the 
statutory rate, and thus affect ETR and ETR Miss; as a result, the predictability of the tax 
credits and foreign-sourced earnings is also important for my research question; and (ii) 
data on tax credits and federal income tax attributed to foreign-sourced earnings are not 
readily available from Compustat; 38  giving my research question, the benefit of 
                                                 
35 Although my PD proxy is backed out using ETR, PD and ETR are two different things, and 
they have different properties. In particular, the variance of ETR depends on the variance of pre-
tax earnings, while the variance of PD does not necessarily depend on the variance of pre-tax 
earnings. 
36 Technically tax credits need to be deducted from total income tax expense on the right hand 
side for the above equation to hold. Not deducting tax credits on the right hand side allows the 
backed out PD to also include the effect of tax credits on ETR. 
37 Two types of foreign-sourced earnings can cause deviation of ETR from the statutory rate: (i) 
foreign earnings at a lower foreign rate that are designated as “permanently reinvested” can cause 
PD, as firms are not required to accrue deferred tax expense for such foreign earnings; and (ii) 
foreign earnings at a higher foreign rate can cause PD, because the excess of foreign tax over 
federal tax can be used to offset federal income tax on foreign earnings from other low tax 
regions through foreign tax credit. On the other hand, foreign earnings at a lower foreign rate that 
are not designated as “permanently reinvested” do not cause PD, because firms are required to 
accrue deferred tax for the difference between the (low) foreign income tax and (high) federal 
income tax (i.e., these foreign earnings result in temporary differences). Similarly, foreign 
earnings at an equal rate do not cause PD, as these foreign earnings do not result in book-tax 
differences. 
38  Foreign pre-tax income and foreign income tax expense are available from Compustat. 
However, in order to separate the effect of foreign-sourced income on ETR from my broad PD 
proxy, federal income tax expense associated with foreign-sourced earnings also needs to be 
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separating the effect of tax credits and foreign-sourced earnings from the broad PD proxy 
is marginal, which does not outweigh the cost of hand collecting data on tax credits and 
foreign-sourced earnings causing PD (i.e., foreign earnings designated as “permanently 
reinvested”) from the annual reports.  
On the other hand, my PD proxy excludes state income taxes from total income tax 
expense for two reasons: (i) state income taxes are stable within the year for most firms 
and thus should not affect ETR Miss; and (ii) state income taxes are a second layer of tax 
(i.e., levied in addition to the statutory tax rate for federal income tax) on the same 
income that is already subject to federal income taxes, and thus add to the statutory tax 
rate to get to ETR.39 
 
The Existence of Tax Loss Carryfoward 
The existence of tax loss carryfoward could affect ETR Miss through predictability, 
because the realization of the tax benefits associated with the losses depends on firms’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
excluded from total federal income tax, which is not possible using Compustat data. In particular, 
the reported federal income tax expense in Compustat not only includes federal income tax 
expense on domestic earnings, but also includes federal income tax expense on foreign earnings 
(which equals the difference between the low foreign income tax and high U.S. income tax): 
when such foreign earnings are repatriated to the U.S., the differential tax is included in current 
federal income tax expense; when such foreign earnings are not repatriated to the U.S. and not 
designated as “permanently reinvested”, the differential tax is included in deferred federal income 
tax expense. Only foreign earnings that are designated as “permanently reinvested” can be 
exempt from this requirement (i.e., firms can choose not to accrue deferred tax expense for 
“permanently reinvested” foreign earnings, which cause permanent differences). 
39 Unlike state income taxes, foreign income taxes do not add to the statutory tax rate to get to 
ETR, because foreign income taxes result from a difference source of income, which is subject to 
federal income taxes only to the extent that federal income tax is higher than the foreign income 
tax. In other words, foreign income tax is not levied in addition to the statutory tax rate; instead, 
foreign income tax is either at a lower rate than the statutory rate, or is at the same rate as the 
statutory tax rate. 
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long-term future profitability, i.e., if firms do not think they can generate enough profits 
to utilize the tax losses within the 20-year net operating loss carryforward period, then 
they need to create a valuation allowance for the part of tax benefit that is not realizable. 
The valuation allowance gives rise to PD by reducing the initial tax benefits from the tax 
loss carryforward. Future revisions of such valuation allowance also affect PD in a 
similar way. Thus the predictability of the business fundamentals could affect ETR Miss 
through changes in PD associated with the recoverability of the tax loss carryforward. As 
a result, the existence of tax loss carryfoward is hypothesized to be negatively associated 
with predictability and positively associated with ETR Miss.40 
 
The Availability of R&D Tax Credit 
In addition to the PD proxy that captures PD caused by all kinds of tax credits, I 
also include a proxy for R&D tax credit specifically, because of the popularity and 
importance of R&D tax credit among firms.  
The availability of R&D tax credit could affect ETR Miss through predictability for 
two reasons. First, the availability and the amount of R&D tax credits depend on the 
amount of qualified revenue and R&D expenses; firms are thus required to estimate the 
qualified revenue and R&D expense on an annual basis on each interim date, which adds 
to firms’ difficulty for estimating annual ETR on interim dates. Second, R&D tax credit 
                                                 
40  Besides predictability, earnings management could also results in changes in valuation 
allowance. For example, Frank and Rego (2006) find that discretionary changes in valuation 
allowance is associated with earnings management incentive to meet analyst forecasts. Because I 
use the existence of tax loss carryforward rather than discretionary changes in valuation 
allowance, I see this proxy more of representing predictability than earnings management. 
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is a temporary tax credit that is subject to frequent renewal, the result of which is not 
guaranteed; the uncertainty of the tax law also adds to firms’ difficulty for predicting 
annual ETR on interim dates. 41  Overall, the availability of R&D tax credit is 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with predictability and positively associated 
with ETR Miss. 
 
The Scale of Foreign Operations 
The scale of foreign operations could affect ETR Miss through predictability 
because ETR is the weighted average of statutory rate and foreign rates where firms have 
operations in; the weighted average (i.e., the realized ETR) depends on the mix of foreign 
earnings at different foreign rates (when they are designated as “permanently 
reinvested”). As a result, the overall importance of foreign operations adds to the 
difficulty of firms in predicting the mix of foreign earnings on an annual basis on each 
interim date. The scale of foreign operations is thus hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with predictability and positively associated with ETR Miss. 
 
5.1.2     Proxies for Testing the Earnings Management Hypothesis 
Previous discussion posits an overall positive association between ETR Miss and 
earnings management, and analyzes the three classes of forces that could affect ETR Miss 
through earnings management: (i) managers’ flexibility with earnings management; (ii) 
                                                 
41 For example, a recent working paper by Bratten and Hulse (2014) shows that the effects of 
retroactive extensions of R&D tax credit contribute to the average decrease in ETR from the third 
to fourth quarter. 
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firms’ general attitudes towards compliance with regulations; and (iii) the effectiveness 
of monitoring mechanisms. I discuss specific proxies under each class of forces below.  
 
Managers’ Flexibility with Earnings Management 
I use the scale of foreign operations as a proxy for managers’ flexibility with 
earnings management, because prior studies show that firms with more foreign operations 
are better able to reallocate earnings to foreign locations to meet financial reporting 
incentives, e.g., by changing the proportion of foreign earnings designated as 
“permanently reinvested” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Krull 2004).42 When this is the 
case, the scale of foreign operations serves as an indicator of firms’ freedom to 
manipulate annual ETR estimates when needed (i.e., to meet varying incentives at 
different time of the year). As a result, the scale of foreign operations is hypothesized to 
be positively associated with earnings management and ETR Miss.43 
 
Firms’ General Attitudes towards Compliance with Regulations 
Assuming firms’ general attitudes towards compliance with regulations are the 
overarching forces that guide specific firm behaviors, and firms are persistent in applying 
                                                 
42 These studies also show that firms with more foreign operations are better able to reallocate 
earnings to foreign locations to save taxes. However, this part of the evidence is less relevant for 
my study because the tax planning associated with foreign operations (e.g., setting up a subsidiary 
in tax haven) is less likely to vary within the year, and thus should not affect ETR Miss. 
43 Although my previous analysis shows that the scale of foreign operations could affect ETR 
Miss through predictability because of the difficulty associated with predicting the mix of foreign 
earnings on an annual basis on each interim date, the scale of foreign operations could also affect 
ETR Miss through EM because of the subjectivity associated with the proportion of foreign 
earnings that are designated as “permanently reinvested”, i.e., whether foreign earnings from low 
tax regions result in permanent difference or temporary difference could be a matter a 
classification, which depends on whether the designation is made. 
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the general attitudes, reflections of such attitudes should be associated with each other. I 
argue that the earnings management dimension of ETR Miss is one reflection of such 
general attitudes, and managers’ actual manipulation of annual ETR estimates may be 
strengthened (when the general attitudes are aggressive) or constrained (when the general 
attitudes are conservative) by the general attitudes. I propose two proxies for firms’ 
general attitudes towards compliance with regulations: (i) firms’ tax aggressiveness, and 
(ii) firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness.44  
Prior studies have shown that firms’ tax aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness are positively associated with each other (Frank et al. 2009). The 
relationship between the two and ETR Miss then depends on whether ETR Miss 
increases with aggressiveness or conservatism. I argue that the average effect of the 
monotonically decreasing trend of intra-year annual ETR estimates documented in prior 
research (Comprix et al. 2012) suggests ETR Miss is more representative of 
aggressiveness rather than conservatism. This is so for two reasons.  
First, accounting standards require unbiased estimation. Although managers have 
discretion for accounting estimates, the discretion is considered non-aggressive only 
when allowed under GAAP; on the other hand, deviations from accounting standards 
                                                 
44 Although tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness are both measured on an 
annual basis, which may appear different from the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates as 
captured by ETR Miss, the three may be of the same nature to the extent that they are all 
reflections of firms’ general attitudes towards compliance with regulations.  
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(such as instilling a systematic bias for annual ETR estimates) should be seen as 
aggressiveness rather than conservatism.45  
Second, annual ETR estimated on interim dates (Q1-Q3 YTD ETR) is unaudited, 
while actual annual ETR at the year-end (or equivalently, Q4 YTD ETR) is audited. If 
auditors are more conservative than managers (or as conservative as managers, but not 
less conservative than managers due to litigation and reputation concerns), then actual 
annual ETR at the year-end should be more conservative than annual ETR estimated on 
interim dates, other things equal. This argument implies that actual annual ETR at the 
year-end should be higher than annual ETR estimated on interim dates. However, 
empirical observation shows the opposite to be true: actual annual ETR at the year-end is 
lower than annual ETR estimated in earlier quarters, which suggests that managers, rather 
than auditors, may purposefully and aggressively lower annual ETR estimates to suit 
their needs at the year-end (in which case auditors do not adjust upward).  
If ETR Miss indeed increases with aggressive firm attitudes towards compliance 
with regulations, then firms’ tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
are hypothesized to be positively associated with earnings management and ETR Miss. 
 
The Effectiveness of Monitoring Mechanisms 
Even when firms face high market pressures for meeting varying incentives at 
different time of the year and managers are willing to manipulate annual ETR estimates 
                                                 
45 The fact that the systematic bias of higher ETR in earlier quarters implies higher tax expenses 
in earlier quarters should not change this claim, despite the impression that higher expenses 
earlier may be seen as associated with conservatism. 
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to meet the varying incentives, effective internal and external monitoring mechanisms 
can reduce the actual earnings management activities, and reduce ETR Miss. In other 
words, the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms is hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with ETR Miss. I propose four proxies for the effectiveness of monitoring 
mechanisms: (i) the strength of corporate governance, (ii) the use of auditor provided tax 
services, (iii) the existence of internal control weakness, and (iv) the existence of 
earnings restatement.   
The strength of corporate governance is a direct measure of the effectiveness of 
monitoring mechanisms, and is hypothesized to be negatively associated with ETR Miss. 
The use of auditor provided tax services could affect monitoring effectiveness to the 
extent that more careful and accurate annual ETR estimates on interim dates arise as a 
result of the tax expertise and knowledge sharing of the auditor (assuming 
communication between tax people and audit people is easier if both groups belong to the 
same auditor). If this is true, then auditor provided tax services is hypothesized to be 
positively associated with the monitoring effectiveness and thus negatively associated 
with ETR Miss. If, on the other hand, auditor provided tax services raises a threat to 
auditor independence, then auditor provided tax services is expected to be negatively 
associated monitoring effectiveness and thus positively associated with ETR Miss. Or, if 
the two forces offset each other, auditor provides tax services may not be associated with 
ETR Miss. 
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The existence of internal control weakness is a direct indicator of the 
ineffectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms, and is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with ETR Miss. 
The existence of earnings restatement is a stronger and more extreme indicator of 
the ineffectiveness of monitoring mechanisms, and is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with ETR Miss. 
 
5.1.3     Variables and Predictions 
In accordance with the above analysis, I model ETR Miss as a function of both 
predictability proxies and earnings management proxies. I specify the model for 
estimating the determinants of ETR Miss using the following Equation (1).  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐼𝐶𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽11ln𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘=1
11 𝛾𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛴𝑡=2002
2011 𝜙𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡 
(1) 
 
where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 is the measure for ETR Miss, as defined before; 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷 is a measure for 
the volatility of permanent difference, defined as the coefficient of variation of annual 
permanent differences over the past five years, with the proxy for permanent differences 
as defined before; 𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 is a measure for the existence of tax loss carry forward (TLCF), 
defined as an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with TLCF; 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  is a 
measure for the availability of R&D tax credit, defined as an indicator variable equal to 
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one for firm-years with positive values of estimated R&D tax credit;46  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 is a 
measure for the scale of foreign operation, defined as the absolute value of foreign pre-
tax income scaled by total pre-tax income; 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  is a measure for firms’ tax 
aggressiveness, defined as cash effective tax rate over the past three years (Dyreng et al. 
2008); 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 is a measure for firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness, defined as the 
absolute value of discretional accruals from modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; 
Kothari et al. 2005); 𝐺𝑜𝑣 is a measure for the strength of corporate governance, defined 
as the percentage of institutional holding (Hartzell and Starks 2003);  𝐴𝑇𝑆 is a measure 
for the use of auditor provided tax services (ATS), defined as  an indicator variable equal 
to one for firm-years with ATS; 𝐼𝐶𝑊 is a measure for the existence of internal control 
weakness (ICW) in tax, defined as an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with 
ICW in tax; and 𝑅𝐸𝑆  is a measure for the existence of earnings restatement (RES), 
defined as an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years with RES.47 
In addition to the test variables described above, I include size as a control 
variable,48 where size is measured by 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸, defined as the natural logarithm of market 
                                                 
46 I estimate R&D tax credit using the method described in Bratten and Hulse (2014), where both 
the regular R&D credit and two alternative R&D credits (i.e., alternative incremental research 
credit and alternative simplified credit) are considered. Following Bratten and Hulse (2014), I use 
R&D expenses and sales reported on Compustat (𝑋𝑅𝐷 and 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸) to proxy for qualified research 
expenses and gross receipts, respectively. 
47 Alternative measures are used in robustness check for: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔, and 𝐼𝐶𝑊. 
See Appendix A for details. Inferences remain similar using the alternative measures, as shown in 
robustness check. 
48 I include firm size as a control variable rather than form a specific hypothesis for it because the 
predictions for size are unclear: on the one hand, firm size could be negatively associated with 
ETR Miss because of (i) the positive relationship between firm size and predictability (in the 
sense that larger firms tend to have more stable business models resulting in higher 
predictability), and/or (ii) the negative relationship between firm size and earning management 
(in the sense that larger firms tend to have better governance resulting in lower earnings 
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value of equity (𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹 × 𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂). I also include industry and year fixed effects.49 Full 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
H1a predicts that through the predictability dimension, ETR Miss is increasing in 
the volatility of permanent difference (𝛽1 > 0: ETR is harder to predict for firms with 
more volatile permanent differences), the existence of tax loss carryforward (𝛽2 > 0: 
ETR is harder to predict for firms with tax loss carryforward, as recoverability of tax loss 
carryforward depends on long-term future profitability), the existence of R&D tax credit 
(𝛽3 > 0: ETR is harder to predict for firms with R&D tax credit), and the scale of foreign 
operations (𝛽4 > 0: ETR is harder to predict for firms with more important foreign 
operations). 
H1b predicts that through the earnings management dimension, ETR Miss is 
increasing in the scale of foreign operations (𝛽4 > 0: firms with foreign operations have 
more flexibility to manipulate earnings through intra-year changes in annual ETR),50 
firms’ tax aggressiveness (𝛽5 > 0: firms that are more aggressive in tax planning are 
more likely to be aggressive in other ways), firms’ financial reporting aggressiveness 
(𝛽6 > 0: firms that are more aggressive in financial reporting are more likely to be 
aggressive in other ways), the existence of internal control weakness in tax (𝛽9 > 0: 
                                                                                                                                                 
management); on the other hand, firm size could be positively associated with ETR Miss because 
of the positive relationship between firm size and earnings management (in the sense that larger 
firms tend to have higher market pressure resulting in higher cost for missing market expectations 
and thus higher actual earnings management). 
49 Industry fixed effects are defined using Fama-French 12 industry classification (Fama and 
French 1997). 
50 Note that since the scale of foreign operations is a test variable for both the predictability 
hypothesis and the earnings management hypothesis, and both hypotheses predict the same 
positive relationship between ETR Miss and the scale of foreign operations, I cannot differentiate 
between the two hypotheses based on the test results on the scale of foreign operations. 
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ineffective internal control is less likely to curtail earnings management through intra-
year changes in annual ETR), and the existence of earnings restatement ( 𝛽10 > 0 : 
ineffective monitoring is less likely to curtail earnings management); and ETR Miss is 
decreasing in the strength of corporate governance (𝛽7 < 0: effective monitoring is more 
likely to curtail earnings management through intra-year changes in annual ETR).51 
 
5.2     Descriptive Statistics for Determinants of ETR Miss 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the determinants 
of ETR Miss. Panel A reconciles the main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 
metric: 61,557 firm-year observations over 1993-2012) to the sample for testing 
determinants of ETR Miss (17,105 firm-year observations over 2002-2012). The main 
reason for the reduction in sample size is due to data limitations on internal control 
weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) and auditor provided tax service (𝐴𝑇𝑆), which are available in Audit 
Analytics from 2002 and 2000, respectively. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for 
variables used in this section (N = 17,105). Panel C presents correlations, with little 
evidence of multicollinearity. 
[Table 3] 
 
                                                 
51 The prediction for auditor provided tax services (ATS) can be positive or negative, depending 
on the assumptions. In particular, ETR Miss is expected to be decreasing in ATS (𝛽8 < 0) if ATS 
indicates higher quality tax accrual and more effective external monitoring; ETR Miss is expected 
to be increasing in ATS (𝛽8 > 0) if ATS indicates independence threat and less effective external 
monitoring. 
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5.3     Empirical Results for Determinants of ETR Miss 
Table 4 presents results testing determinants of ETR Miss (N = 17,105 for the full 
model in Panel A; or N = 36,815 for the abbreviated model in Panel B, where 𝐼𝐶𝑊 and 
𝐴𝑇𝑆 are excluded to get a larger sample size; the discussion below refers to the full 
model in Panel A). The results show significantly positive coefficients for 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷 (0.003, 
t-stat = 2.36), 𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 (0.112, t-stat = 4.93), 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅 (0.067, t-stat = 2.21) 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 (0.520, 
t-stat = 11.25), 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔 (0.356, t-stat = 7.18),52 𝐼𝐶𝑊  (0.368, t-stat = 3.35), and 𝑅𝐸𝑆 
(0.165, t-stat = 3.67); and a significantly negative coefficient for 𝐺𝑜𝑣 (-0.001, t-stat = -
2.46), indicating that ETR Miss is increasing in the volatility of permanent difference, the 
existence of tax loss carryforward, the availability of R&D tax credit, the scale of foreign 
operations, firms’ tax aggressiveness, the existence of internal control weakness in tax, 
and the existence of earnings restatement, and ETR Miss is decreasing in the strength of 
corporate governance. Results on 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 and 𝐴𝑇𝑆 are insignificant. These results are 
consistent with the hypotheses under H1a and H1b that ETR Miss is affected by factors 
from both the predictability dimension and the earnings management dimension. 
Further analysis of effect size suggests that the scale of foreign earnings (𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛) 
is the single most important contributor to the explained variance of ETR Miss, where the 
proportion of the total variance of ETR Miss attributed to the effect of 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 is 2%. 
The proportion of the total variance attributed to the other six earnings management 
proxies combined (i.e., 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔, 𝐺𝑜𝑣, 𝐴𝑇𝑆, 𝐼𝐶𝑊, and 𝑅𝐸𝑆) is 1%; while the 
                                                 
52 The presented results on 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔 are the estimated results multiplied by negative one because 
the measure used for tax aggressiveness in the main test is cash effective tax rate over the past 
three years, with higher values of cash ETR indicating lower tax aggressiveness, while the 
interpretation is for higher tax aggressiveness. 
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proportion of the total variance attributed to the other three predictability proxies 
combined (i.e., 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷, 𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠, and 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅) is 0.3%.53, 54, 55 
[Table 4] 
 
6. ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
6.1     Research Design for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
I investigate the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence by testing 
whether the persistence of pre-tax earnings and earnings components (i.e., the accruals 
and cash flow components of pre-tax earnings) change with the level of ETR Miss. In 
particular, consistent with prior studies on earnings persistence and properties of 
accounting/tax choices (Hanlon 2005; McGuire et al. 2013), I estimate the persistence of 
pre-tax earnings using the following Equation (2a). 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 (2a) 
 
                                                 
53 The effect size of a single predictor (or a group of predictors) is the proportion of the total 
variance that is attributed to the effect of this predictor (or group of predictors). The effect size of 
a single predictor (or a group of predictors) is the unique contribution after accounting for the 
contributions of all other predictors in the model (i.e., the proportion of variance explained by the 
single predictor, or the group of predictors that is not explained by all other predictors in the 
model). The effect size is estimated using partial R-squared. Note that the effect size of a group of 
predictors is not the same as the sum of the effect size of each predictor in the group because of 
the correlations between the predictors. 
54 For comparison, the proportion of the total variance explained by the model (i.e., adjusted R-
squared) is about 6%. However, the effect size of all single predictors (or groups of predictors) of 
the model need not add up to R-squared, because the effect size is the unique contribution after 
accounting for contributions of all other predictors in the model (R-squared and the sum of the 
effect size will not be exactly the same unless all predictors in the model are uncorrelated).  
55 The effect size of the scale of foreign operations is separately presented, rather than grouped 
with other predictability proxies or other earnings management proxies, because the scale of 
foreign operations could be a proxy for both predictability and earnings management, as 
discussed before. The importance of its effect size also necessitates the highlighted separate 
presentation for the scale of foreign operations.  
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where 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1  is the one-year-ahead pre-tax book income (𝑃𝐼𝑡+1), and 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  is the 
current year pre-tax book income (𝑃𝐼𝑡 ), both scaled by average total assets for the 
corresponding year ( 𝐴𝑇 ). To examine the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings 
persistence, I estimate the following Equation (2b). 




where all variables are as defined before. If firm-years with higher ETR Miss exhibit less 
persistent pre-tax earnings (either because less predictable earnings are less persistent; or 
because more highly manipulated earnings are less persistent; or both), then 𝛽3 < 0, 
consistent with predictions of H2a that pre-tax earnings persistence decreases with ETR 
Miss. 
To further explore the issue, I estimate the consequence of ETR Miss on the 
persistence of earnings components. Consistent with prior studies (Hanlon 2005; 
McGuire et al. 2013), and parallel to Equations (2a) and (2b), I estimate whether ETR 
Miss affects the persistence of the cash flow component and accruals component of pre-
tax earnings using the following Equations (3a) and (3b). 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 (3a) 
 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1 
(3b) 
 
where PTCF is pre-tax cash flow, defined as total operating cash flow less cash flow 
from extraordinary items plus cash taxes paid (𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹 − 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶 + 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷); and PTACC 
is pre-tax accruals, defined as pre-tax book income less pre-tax cash flows (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼 −
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𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹); both are scaled by average total assets (𝐴𝑇). All other variables are as defined 
previously. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
If firm-years with higher ETR Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax cash flow and 
pre-tax accruals, then 𝛽4 < 0 and 𝛽5 < 0, consistent with predictions of H2b and H2c that 
the persistence of the accruals component and that of the cash flow component of pre-tax 
earnings both decrease with ETR Miss. 
 
6.2     Descriptive Statistics for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the consequence 
of ETR Miss on earnings persistence and the persistence of earnings components. Panel 
A reconciles the main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric: 61,557 firm-
year observations over 1993-2012) to the sample for testing the consequence of ETR 
Miss on earnings persistence and the persistence of earnings components (57,291 firm-
year observations over 1993-2012). The main reason for the reduction in sample size is 
due to the unavailability of one-year ahead pre-tax earnings for fiscal 2012 (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1). 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for variables used in this section (N = 57,291). 
Panel C presents correlations, with little evidence of multicollinearity. 
[Table 5] 
 
6.3     Empirical Results for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
Table 6 Panel A presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings 
persistence (N = 57,291). The results show a significantly negative coefficient for the 
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interaction term 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼  (-0.078, t-stat = -7.51), indicating that firm-years with 
higher ETR Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax earnings, consistent with the hypothesis 
under H2a that pre-tax earnings persistence decreases with ETR Miss. 
Table 6 Panel B presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the 
persistence of earnings components (N = 57,291). The results show significantly negative 
coefficients for the interaction terms 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹  (-0.053, t-stat = -5.39) and 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 (-0.059, t-stat = -5.50), indicating that firm-years with higher ETR 
Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax cash flows and pre-tax accruals, consistent with the 
hypothesis under H2b and H2c that the persistence of pre-tax accruals and pre-tax cash 
flows decrease with ETR Miss. 
Taken together, these results indicate that firms with higher ETR Miss exhibit less 
persistent pre-tax earnings and earnings components, consistent with ETR Miss 
containing unique information about pre-tax earnings and earnings components. 
[Table 6] 
 
7. ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
7.1     Research Design for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
I investigate the consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance of accounting 
information by testing whether the weights investors place on accounting earnings 
change with the level of ETR Miss. I conduct this test using long-window associations 
study rather than short-window event study, because information about ETR Miss is 
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gradually released during the year, rather than suddenly revealed around earnings 
announcements dates. 
Following theory work of Ohlson (1995) and decades of empirical studies (Collins 
et al. 1997) on the value relevance of accounting information, I estimate the following 
Equations (4a) and (4b) for testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance 
of accounting information. 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘=1
11 𝛾𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛴𝑡=1993
2011 𝜙𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡 (4a) 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑉𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘=1
11 𝛾𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛴𝑡=1993
2011 𝜙𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡 
(4b) 
 
where P is the stock price measured three months after the current fiscal year end; E is 
earnings per share (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑋); and BV is book value per share (𝐵𝐾𝑉𝐿𝑃𝑆).56 All other 
variables are as defined before. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
If the information content in ETR Miss is substantial enough to make a difference 
for market valuation of accounting information, that is, if market recognizes that higher 
ETR Miss reflects accounting earnings that are less persistent and thus of lower quality, 
then the market will place a lower weight on earnings associated with higher ETR Miss 
(𝛽4 < 0), consistent with predictions of H3 that market valuation of earnings decreases 
with ETR Miss.  
 
                                                 
56 While I estimate the scaled valuation model (i.e., all variables are scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding) in the main test, I also estimate the unscaled valuation model (i.e., using the 
total values rather than the per share values for the variables) for robustness check, where I 
alternatively define 𝑃2 as total market value of equity, measured three month after the current 
fiscal year end; 𝐸2 as total earnings (𝑁𝐼); and 𝐵𝑉2 as total book values (𝐶𝐸𝑄). 
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7.2     Descriptive Statistics for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the consequence 
of ETR Miss on the value relevance of accounting information. Panel A reconciles the 
main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric: 61,557 firm-year observations 
over 1993-2012) to the sample for testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value 
relevance of accounting information (60,829 firm-year observations over 1993-2012). 
The reduction in sample size is due to introducing additional variables used in this 
section. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for variables used in this section (N = 
60,829). Panel C presents correlations, with little evidence of multicollinearity. 
[Table 7] 
 
7.3     Empirical Results for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
Table 8 Panel A presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value 
relevance of accounting information using the scaled valuation model (N = 60,829). The 
results show a significantly negative coefficient for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐸  (-1.168, t-stat = -
13.41), indicating that investors place a lower weight on accounting earnings associated 
with higher ETR Miss (indicating less persistent and thus lower quality earnings), 
consistent with the hypothesis under H3 that market valuation of earnings decreases with 
ETR Miss. Also, the results show a significantly positive coefficient for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉 
(0.148, t-stat = 13.19), indicating that investors place a higher weight on book value 
associated with higher ETR Miss. Though I do not make a prediction for the valuation of 
book value, the higher valuation weight for book value associated with higher ETR Miss 
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is consistent with investors relying more on book value instead of earnings for valuation 
assessment when earnings are of lower quality. 
Table 8 Panel B presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value 
relevance of accounting information using the unscaled valuation model (N = 61,042). 
Inferences remain the same as those under the scaled valuation model in Panel A. 
Taken together, these results indicate that for firms with higher ETR Miss, investors 
place a lower weight on the valuation of accounting earnings, consistent with higher ETR 
Miss indicating less persistent (and lower quality) earnings. 
[Table 8] 
 
8. Supplemental Analyses 
In previous sections, I have tested the information content of ETR Miss on the 
quality of annual earnings, and whether such information affects the value relevance of 
annual earnings. In this section, I extend the analysis to quarterly earnings as 
supplemental analysis. In particular, I conduct quarterly analysis for the consequences of 
ETR Miss on quarterly earnings for: (i) the persistence of quarterly earnings; and (2) the 
value relevance of quarterly earnings. 
 
8.1     ETR Miss and the Persistence of Quarterly Earnings 
To test whether ETR Miss contains information about the persistence of quarterly 
earnings, I re-estimate Equations (2b) and (3b) using quarterly data, where the one-year-
ahead earnings from the annual analysis now becomes the four-quarter-ahead earning for 
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the quarterly analysis.  
Table 9 Panel A presents results testing ETR Miss and the persistence of quarterly 
earnings. Inferences are similar to those from the annual analysis: quarterly earnings 
associated with higher ETR Miss are less persistent. In particular, for tests of earnings 
persistence, the results show a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼  (-0.060, t-stat = -11.95), indicating that firm-years with higher ETR 
Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax earnings, consistent with the hypothesis under H2a 
that pre-tax earnings persistence decreases with ETR Miss. 
For tests of the persistence of earnings components, the results show significantly 
negative coefficients for the interaction terms 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹 (-0.055, t-stat = -11.37) 
and 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 (-0.055, t-stat = -11.46), indicating that firm-years with higher 
ETR Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax cash flows and pre-tax accruals, consistent with 
the hypothesis under H2b and H2c that the persistence of pre-tax accruals and pre-tax cash 
flows decrease with ETR Miss. 
 
8.2     ETR Miss and the Value Relevance of Quarterly Earnings 
To test whether the information content in ETR Miss affects market valuation of 
quarterly earnings, I re-estimate Equation (4b) using quarterly data, where quarter fixed 
effect is included in addition to industry and year fixed effects as in the annual analysis. 
Table 9 Panel B presents results testing ETR Miss and the value relevance of 
quarterly earnings. Inferences are similar to those from the annual analysis: investors 
place a lower valuation weight on quarterly earnings associated with higher ETR Miss. In 
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particular, results form both the scaled valuation model and the unscaled valuation model 
show a significantly negative coefficient for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐸 (-2.090, t-stat = -13.84 from 
the scaled valuation model; -3.225, t-stat = -8.48 from the unscaled valuation model), 
consistent with the hypothesis under H3 that market valuation of earnings decreases with 
ETR Miss.  
[Table 9] 
 
9. Robustness Check 
I conduct a battery of robustness checks to verify the validity of my findings. For 
each of my three main empirical tests, i.e., (i) the determinants of ETR Miss; (ii) the 
consequence of ETR Miss on annual earnings persistence; and (iii) the consequence of 
ETR Miss on the value relevance of annual earnings, I re-run the estimations (i) using 
alternative measures of the regression variables; and (ii) after alternative sample 
exclusions. Additionally, for ETR Miss and the value relevance of annual earnings, I also 
report results from two-stage estimation, to mitigate concerns that determinants of ETR 
Miss, rather than ETR Miss itself may drive the results.  
Further, for all three main empirical tests, I report results for the first half of my 
sample period (i.e., 1993-2002) and the second half of my sample period (i.e., 2003-
2012) separately to see whether the results are robust to alternative sample periods; I also 
report results for all three tests using an alternative sample selection criterion that 
requires data availability for annual ETR estimates on all three interim dates for a firm to 
be included in the sample.  
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9.1     Robustness Check for Determinants of ETR Miss 
Table 10 presents results for robustness check for determinants of ETR Miss. Panel 
A shows results using alternative definitions of regression variables; Panel B shows 
results using alternative sample exclusions.  
Table 10 Panel A presents results using six alternative measures of regression 
variables. 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4 and 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 are alternative measures for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠: 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4 uses 
Q4 year-to-date ETR from Compustat Quarterly to replace year-end annual ETR from 
Compustat Annual for computation of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 as defined in Appendix A;57 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 is 
the unadapted coefficient of variation of the four annual ETR estimates made during the 
year.58 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅  and 𝑈𝑇𝐵 are alternative measures for 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔. 𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐴𝐶  is 
an alternative measure for 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔. 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛 is an alternative measure for 𝐼𝐶𝑊. 
Overall, the results are similar to those from the main test, with the exception of 
𝑈𝑇𝐵, where several determinants (i.e., 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷, 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅, 𝑅𝐸𝑆) become insignificant. This 
could be due to reduced power resulting from a much smaller sample size (the sample 
size is about one third of that in other specifications), since unlike other regression 
variables, data for 𝑈𝑇𝐵 is only available from 2007 onwards.  
Table 10 Panel B presents results after four alternative sample exclusions: (i) after 
                                                 
57 This alternative measure is used because although actual annual ETR at the year-end from 
Compustat Annual should be the same as Q4 year-to-date ETR from Compustat Quarterly, 9% of 
my main sample (or 5,159 out of 49,367 firm-year observations with data available for both) 
shows different numbers between the two.  
58 This alternative measure is used to mitigate the concern some people may have that since prior 
literature finds actual annual ETR at the year-end could be manipulated to meet analyst forecasts, 
it may not be a good benchmark for the unobservable “true” or “unmanaged” annual ETR, in 
which case the mean annual ETR estimates during the year could serve as a better benchmark. 
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excluding special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼);59 (ii) after 
excluding special items from Compustat Quarterly (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄);60 (iii) 
after excluding all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; and (iv) 
after excluding firm-years with different Q4 year-to-date ETR (from Compustat 
Quarterly) and year-end annual ETR (from Compustat Annual). Results from both the 
full model (with all determinates included) and the abbreviated model (with 𝐴𝑇𝑆 and 
𝐼𝐶𝑊 excluded) are presented. 
Results are similar to those from the main test, with the exception of sample 
exclusion for special items, where two determinants (i.e., 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷 , 𝑅𝐸𝑆 ) become 
insignificant or less significant. This could be due to special items being a major 
contributor to the intra-year error in annual ETR estimates (thus excluding special items 
makes the results weaker), or it could be due to reduced power resulting from a much 
smaller sample size (the sample size is one third of that before sample exclusion), since 
special items are a frequent occurrence in my sample.61  
[Table 10] 
 
                                                 
59 I exclude firm-years with special items because the integral method for income tax expense 
only applies to recurring earnings from continuing operations; while the discrete method is 
required for infrequent or unusual items. Because income tax expenses for infrequent or unusual 
items are not reported separately, I exclude firm-years with special items to mitigate noises 
introduced by these items. 
60 Special items reported by Compustat Annual and Compustat Quarterly are similar with minor 
differences. 
61 The fact that results from the abbreviated model in Columns (5) – (8) show higher significance 
levels for 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷 and 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅 than those from the full model in Columns (1) – (4) lends some 
support for lack of power as an explanation, since the abbreviated model has a much larger 
sample size than the full model; on the other hand, the insignificance of 𝑅𝐸𝑆 in the abbreviated 
model after excluding special items suggests special items may be a major contributor to the 
relationship between earnings restatement and ETR Miss. 
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9.2     Robustness Check for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
Table 11 presents results for the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence. 
Panel A shows results using alternative definitions of regression variables; Panel B shows 
results using alternative sample exclusions.  
Table 11 Panel A presents results using three alternative measures of regression 
variables. 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4 and 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 are alternative measures for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠, as defined and 
explained before. 𝑂𝐼 represents alternative measures for pre-tax earnings and earnings 
components, which uses operating income and operating accruals instead of total pre-tax 
income and pre-tax accruals.62  
Table 11 Panel B presents results after four alternative sample exclusions: (i) after 
excluding special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼); (ii) after 
excluding special items from Compustat Quarterly (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄); (iii) 
after excluding all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; and (iv) 
after excluding firm-years with different Q4 year-to-date ETR (from Compustat 
Quarterly) and year-end annual ETR (from Compustat Annual), for reasons discussed 
before.  
Results for both Panel A and Panel B are similar to those from the main test: the 
interaction terms 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼 ; 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹 ; and 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶  show 
significantly negative coefficients in all model specifications, consistent with firms with 
higher ETR Miss exhibit less persistent pre-tax earnings and earnings components.   
[Table 11] 
                                                 
62 This alternative measure is used to test whether ETR Miss contains information about the 
persistence of operating income, which excludes the impact of one-time events. 
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9.3     Robustness Check for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
Table 12 presents results for the consequence of ETR Miss on value relevance from 
the scaled valuation model (i.e., the main specification). Panel A shows results using 
alternative definitions of regression variables; Panel B shows results using alternative 
sample exclusions; Panel C shows results from two-stage estimation. 
Table 12 Panel A presents results using two alternative measures of regression 
variables. In particular, 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4  and 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉  are both alternative measures for 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠, as defined and explained before.  
Table 12 Panel B presents results after four alternative sample exclusions: (i) after 
excluding special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼); (ii) after 
excluding special items from Compustat Quarterly (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄); (iii) 
after excluding all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; and (iv) 
after excluding firm-years with different Q4 year-to-date ETR (from Compustat 
Quarterly) and year-end annual ETR (from Compustat Annual), for reasons discussed 
before.  
Table 12 Panel C presents results from two-stage estimation, to mitigate concerns 
that the determinants of ETR Miss, rather than ETR Miss itself may drive the results. In 
particular, discretionary ETR Miss is tested in the second stage instead of total ETR Miss. 
Discretionary ETR Miss is estimated as the residual value from the first stage model, 
where ETR Miss is modeled as a function of its determinants specified in Equation (1).  
Results for all three panels (i.e., Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C) are similar to those 
from the main test: the interaction term 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐸  shows significantly negative 
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coefficients in all model specifications,63  consistent with the market placing a lower 
valuation weight on earnings associated with higher ETR Miss.   
[Table 12] 
 
9.4     Robustness Check Using Alternative Sample Period 
Table 13 presents results for the first half of the sample period (i.e., 1993-2002) and 
the second half of the sample period (i.e., 2003-2012) separately to see whether the 
results are robust to alternative sample periods. Panel A shows results using alternative 
sample period for testing determinants of ETR Miss; Panel B shows results using 
alternative sample period for testing ETR Miss and earnings persistence; Panel C shows 
results using alternative sample period for testing ETR Miss and value relevance. 
Table 13 Panel A shows results for determinants of ETR Miss using the abbreviated 
model, to ensure comparability between the two sample periods. Results are similar to 
those from the main test with the following differences: (i) in the first half of the sample 
period:  𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅 (significant at the 0.05 level) and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 (significant at the 0.1 level) are 
less significant than in the main test (𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅 and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 are significant at the 0.01 and 
0.05 level in the main test respectively), and 𝑅𝐸𝑆 is insignificant (𝑅𝐸𝑆 is significant at 
the 0.01 level in the main test); and (ii) in the second half of the sample period: 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷 
(significant at the 0.1 level), 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅 (significant at the 0.05 level) and 𝐺𝑜𝑣 (significant at 
the 0.05 level) are less significant (𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷, 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅, and 𝐺𝑜𝑣 are all significant at the 0.01 
level in the main test); and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 is insignificant (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 is significant at the 0.05 
                                                 
63 Results from all specifications are significant at the 0.01 level. 
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level in the main test). 
Table 13 Panel B shows results for ETR Miss and earnings persistence. Results are 
similar to those from the main test except that the persistence of the cash component is 
less significant in the first half of the sample period (significant at the 0.05 level; it is 
significant at the 0.01 level in the main test). 
Table 13 Panel C shows results for ETR Miss and value relevance. Results are 




9.5     Robustness Check Using Alternative Sample Selection 
Table 14 presents results using an alternative sample selection criterion that requires 
data availability for annual ETR estimates on all three interim dates for a firm to be 
included in the sample. This more stringent data requirement results in a smaller sample 
size compared with that in the main test. Panel A shows results using alternative sample 
selection for testing determinants of ETR Miss; Panel B shows results using alternative 
sample selection for testing ETR Miss and earnings persistence; Panel C shows results 
using alternative sample selection for testing ETR Miss and value relevance. 
Table 14 Panel A shows results for determinants of ETR Miss. Column (1) presents 
results from the full model, and Column (2) presents results from the abbreviated model. 
For both models, results are similar to those from the main test, except that 𝑅𝐸𝑆  is 
insignificant in the full model and less significant (significant at the 0.05 level) in the 
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abbreviated model using this alternative sample selection (𝑅𝐸𝑆 is significant at the 0.01 
level in the main test). 
Table 14 Panel B shows results for ETR Miss and earnings persistence, and Panel C 
shows results for ETR Miss and value relevance. Despite the smaller sample size, results 
for both earnings persistence and value relevance using the alternative sample selection 




Prior literature documents a monotonically decreasing trend of annual ETR 
estimates from Q1 to Q4 as an average effect. My study shows that although not 
manifested in the average effect, the majority of firms show different patterns of intra-
year ETR trend (i.e., fluctuating and monotonically increasing) that also persists. Based 
on this observation, I examine why firms are willing to, and able to, maintain persistent 
intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, despite the GAAP requirement that firms 
should make their best estimate of annual ETR on each interim date, and the fact that 
regulators and investors can evaluate how well firms comply with this accounting 
standard by observing realized intra-year error ex post. 
I find that intra-year error in annual ETR estimates, or ETR Miss, is driven by the 
predictability of business fundamentals that result in deviation of ETR from the statutory 
rate, as well as earnings management considerations relating to varying managerial 
incentives within the year. Specifically, my results show that ETR Miss is positively 
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associated with the volatility of permanent differences, the existence of tax loss 
carryforward, the availability of R&D tax credit, the scale of foreign earnings, firms’ tax 
aggressiveness, the existence of internal control weakness, the existence of earnings 
restatement, and ETR Miss is negatively associated with the strength of corporate 
governance. Further, I find that ETR Miss contains unique information on earnings 
quality, and such information is incorporated by the market for valuation assessments. 
My study has implications for standard setters, financial statement users, as well as 
academics. By exploring the puzzle of why interim estimates of annual ETR do not 
converge to actual annual ETR at the year-end, my findings suggest ETR Miss could be 
used as a summary measure for firms' compliance with GAAP, ability to predict business 
outcome, inclination to manipulate earnings through tax accounts, and earnings quality. 
In addition, my study provides a specific channel through which the quality of accounting 
estimates, earnings quality, and the value relevance of accounting information are linked. 
 




Variables Used in the Estimation of Equation (1): 
Determinants of ETR Miss 
Outcome Variable 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 Intra-year error in annual effective tax rate (ETR) estimates 
relative to the actual annual ETR for firm i in year t, defined 
using an adapted version of the coefficient of variation for 
annual ETR estimates made on the three interim dates of the 
year. 
 
While the unadapted coefficient of variation of annual ETR 
estimates (𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉) is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the four annual ETR estimates in year t scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean of the four annual ETR estimates during the 
same year t, the adapted version for my 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 measure is 
constructed by replacing the mean annual ETR estimates with 









𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑞 , annual ETR estimated on each of the three interim 
date, is defined as total year-to-date income tax expense 
divided by total year-to-date pre-tax earnings (𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑌𝑡𝑞/𝑃𝐼𝑌𝑡𝑞), 
obtained from Compustat Quarterly. 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑦, actual annual ETR at the year-end, is defined as annual 
income tax expense divided by annual pre-tax earnings 
(𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑡/𝑃𝐼𝑡), obtained from Compustat Annual. 
 
The adapted coefficient of variation (i.e., 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠) is used in 
the main test; the unadapted coefficient of variation (i.e., 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉) is used in robustness check. In robustness check, I 
also define an alternative measure of ETR Miss using 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4, which is constructed by replacing actual annual ETR 
at the year-end (from Compustat Annual) with year-to-date 
ETR at the end of Q4 (from Compustat Quarterly) in the 
computation of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠. 
Test Variables 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷𝑡  The volatility of permanent differences for firm i in year t, 
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defined as the coefficient of variation for annual permanent 
differences over the past five years. 
 
The coefficient of variation for annual permanent differences 
over the past five years is calculated as the standard deviation 
of annual permanent differences from year 𝑡 − 4  to year t 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean of annual permanent 
differences over the same five-year period. 
 
Permanent differences (𝑃𝐷) is calculated as pre-tax income 
(𝑃𝐼) minus the difference between total income tax expense 
(𝑇𝑋𝑇) and state income tax expense (𝑇𝑋𝑆 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆) divided by 
statutory rate:  
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝐼 − (𝑇𝑋𝑇 − 𝑇𝑋𝑆 − 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆)/0.35.  
 
Permanent differences is calculated this way because the 
difference between pre-tax income and permanent differences 
multiplied by statutory tax rate plus state income tax expense is 
total income tax expense:  
(𝑃𝐼 − 𝑃𝐷)) ∗ 0.35 + 𝑇𝑋𝑆 + 𝑇𝑋𝐷𝑆 = 𝑇𝑋𝑇.  
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑡  A dummy variable representing the existence of tax loss 
carryfoward for firm i in year t. 𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  is coded one when 
Compustat tax loss carry forward (𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹) has a positive value, 
and zero otherwise. 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑡  A dummy variable representing the availability of R&D tax 
credit for firm i in year t. 𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  is coded one when the 
estimated R&D tax credit has a positive value, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
I estimate R&D tax credit using the method described in 
Bratten and Hulse (2014), where both the regular R&D tax 
credit and two alternative R&D tax credits (i.e., alternative 
incremental research credit and alternative simplified credit) 
are considered. Following Bratten and Hulse (2014), I use 
R&D expenses and sales reported on Compustat (𝑋𝑅𝐷  and 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 ) to proxy for qualified research expenses and gross 
receipts, respectively. 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡 The scale of foreign earnings, defined as the absolute value of 
foreign pre-tax income scaled by total pre-tax income (𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑡/
𝑃𝐼𝑡). 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑡  Tax aggressiveness for firm i in year t, proxied by one of the 
following three measures:  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅𝑡 ;  𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅𝑡 ; 
and 𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑡, each as defined below. 
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅𝑡 Cash effective tax rate for firm i, year t over the three prior 
years, calculated as the sum of three years’ cash taxes paid, 
divided by the sum of three years’ pretax net income 
(∑ 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=𝑡−2 / ∑ 𝑃𝐼𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=𝑡−2 ).  
 
This measure is used in the main test. 
𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅𝑡 GAAP effective tax rate for firm i, year t over the three prior 
years, calculated as the sum of three years’ tax expense, 
divided by the sum of three years’ pretax net income 
(∑ 𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑖
𝑡




This measure is used in robustness check. 
𝑈𝑇𝐵𝑡 Unrecognized tax benefit for firm i in year t, calculated as the 
ending balance of the FIN 48 unrecognized tax benefit liability 
scaled by total assets (𝑇𝑋𝑇𝑈𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡/𝐴𝑇𝑡). 
 
This measure is used in robustness check. 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑡  Financial reporting aggressiveness for firm i in year t, proxied 
by one of the following two measures: 𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ; and 
𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡, each as defined below. 
𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 Absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
where discretionary accruals is estimated as the residual value 
from modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; Frank et al. 
2009). 
 
This measure is used in the main test. 
𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 Absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals 
for firm i in year t, where performance-matched discretionary 
accruals is estimated as the difference between the residual 
value from modified Jones model ( 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑡 ) and its industry 
median (Francis et al. 2005; Frank et al. 2009). 
 
This measure is used in robustness check. 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 Strength of corporate governance for firm i in year t, proxied 
by the percentage of institutional holding (Hartzell and Starks 
2003). 
 
The percentage of institutional holding is calculated as the 
percentage of outstanding common shares held by 13(f) 
institutional investors for firm i at the end of year t from 
Thomson Financial’s CDA Spectrum S34 database. 
𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑡 A dummy variable representing the use of auditor provided tax 
services by firm i in year t. 𝐴𝑇𝑆 is coded one if the tax fee 
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variable in Audit Analytics (𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆) has a positive value, 
and zero otherwise. 
𝐼𝐶𝑊𝑡   Internal control weakness for firm i in year t, proxied by one of 
the following two measures: 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡; and 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡, each 
as defined below. 
𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 Internal control weakness in tax, a dummy variable 
representing the existence of tax-related internal control 
weakness for firm i in year t. 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝑇𝐴𝑋 is coded one if a tax 
related reason for SOX 404 or SOX 302 internal control 
weakness is given by Audit Analytics 
(𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐸𝐹𝐹_𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆_𝐾𝐸𝑌𝑆 contains the value of  “41”), and 
zero otherwise. 
 
This measure is used in the main test. 
𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑡   General internal control weakness, a dummy variable 
representing the existence of internal control weakness (for all 
reasons) for firm i in year t. 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛 is coded one if a SOX 
404 or SOX 302 internal control weakness is provided in Audit 
Analytics, and zero otherwise. 
 
This measure is used in robustness check. 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑡 A dummy variable representing the existence of restatement 
for firm i in year t. 𝑅𝐸𝑆 is coded one if it is provided in Audit 
Analytics, and zero otherwise. 
Control Variable 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡 Natural logarithm of market value of equity for firm i in year t 
(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹𝑡 × 𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑡). 
 
Variables Used in the Estimation of Equations (2) and (3): 
Consequence of ETR Miss on Earnings Persistence 
Outcome Variable 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 Pre-tax book income for firm i in year 𝑡 + 1, scaled by average 
total assets (𝑃𝐼𝑡+1/𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡).  
 
𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡  is average total assets for firm i in year t 
((𝐴𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑇𝑡) 2⁄ ). 
 
I alternatively define 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼2𝑡+1 as operating earnings after 
depreciation for firm i in year 𝑡 + 1 scaled by average total 
assets ( 𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑡+1/𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡 ), consistent with Sloan (1996). 
This alternative measure is referred to under the heading of 𝑂𝐼 
in robustness check. 
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For quarterly analysis, 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1 is the four-quarter ahead pre-
tax book income scaled by average total assets ( 𝑃𝐼𝑄𝑞+4/
𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑞), where 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑞 is average total assets for firm i in 
quarter q ((𝐴𝑇𝑄𝑞−1 + 𝐴𝑇𝑄𝑞) 2⁄ ). 
Test Variables 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 Intra-year error in annual ETR estimates relative to the actual 
annual ETR for firm i in year t, as previously defined. 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t, scaled by average total 
assets (𝑃𝐼𝑡/𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡). 
 
I alternatively define 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼2𝑡 as operating earnings after 
depreciation for firm i in year t scaled by average total assets 
( 𝑂𝐼𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑡/𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑡 ), consistent with Sloan (1996). This 
alternative measure is referred to under the heading of 𝑂𝐼 in 
robustness check. 
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  is current quarter pre-tax book 
income scaled by average total assets (𝑃𝐼𝑄𝑞/𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑞). 
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡 Pre-tax cash flow for firm i in year t, scaled by average total 
assets. Pre-tax cash flow equals total operating cash flow less 
cash flow from extraordinary items plus cash taxes paid 
(𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡 − 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑡 + 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑡).  
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  is current quarter pre-tax cash 
flow scaled by average total assets. Current quarter pre-tax 
cash flow equals year-to-date pre-tax cash flow of the current 
quarter minus year-to-date pre-tax cash flow of the prior 
quarter. Year-to-date pre-tax cash flow equals total operating 
cash flow less cash flow from extraordinary items plus cash 
taxes paid (𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑌𝑞 − 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑌𝑞 + 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑌𝑞). 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 Pre-tax accruals for firm i in year t, scaled by average total 
assets. Pre-tax accruals equal pre-tax book income less pre-tax 
cash flows (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡).  
 
I alternatively define 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶2𝑡  as pre-tax operating accruals 
for firm i in year t, scaled by average total assets. Pre-tax 
operating accruals equal operating earnings after depreciation 
less pre-tax cash flows (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼2𝑡 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡).  This alternative 
measure is referred to under the heading of 𝑂𝐼 in robustness 
check. 
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  is current quarter pre-tax 
accruals, scaled by average total assets. Current quarter pre-tax 
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accruals equal current quarter pre-tax book income less current 
quarter pre-tax cash flows (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡 − 𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡). 
 
Variables Used in the Estimation of Equation (4): 
Consequence of ETR Miss on Value Relevance 
Outcome Variable 
𝑃𝑡 Stock price for firm i in year t, measured three months after the 
current fiscal year end. 
 
Alternatively, I define 𝑃2𝑡 as unscaled (i.e., total) market value 
of equity for firm i in year t, measured three month after the 
current fiscal year end. 
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝑃𝑞 is stock price for firm i in quarter q, 
measured three months after the current fiscal quarter end; and 
𝑃2𝑞 is unscaled (i.e., total) market value of equity for firm i in 
quarter q, measured three month after the current fiscal quarter 
end. 
Test Variables 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡 Intra-year error in annual ETR estimates relative to the actual 
annual ETR for firm i in year t, as previously defined. 
𝐸𝑡 
 
Earnings per share for firm i in year t (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑋). 
 
Alternatively, I define 𝐸2𝑡 as unscaled (i.e., total) earnings for 
firm i in year t (𝑁𝐼). 
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝐸𝑞  is earnings per share for firm i in 
quarter q (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑋𝑄); and 𝐸2𝑞 is unscaled quarterly earnings 
for firm i in quarter q (𝑁𝐼𝑄). 
𝐵𝑉𝑡 Book value per share for firm i in year t (𝐵𝐾𝑉𝐿𝑃𝑆). 
 
Alternatively, I define 𝐵𝑉2𝑡 as unscaled (i.e., total) book value 
for firm i in year t (𝐶𝐸𝑄). 
 
For quarterly analysis, 𝐵𝑉𝑞 is book value per share for firm i in 
quarter q, defined as total book value divided by number of 
common shares outstanding (𝐶𝐸𝑄𝑄/𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑄 ); and 𝐵𝑉2𝑞  is 
unscaled book value for firm i in quarter q (𝐶𝐸𝑄𝑄). 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
All U.S. firm-years during 1993-2012 with data on Compustat Annual 
Database 184,098 
Less: 
 Firm-years with negative pretax income, negative ETRs, or ETRs above 1 67,238 
Firm-years in the financial services industry (SICs 6726, 6792, 6795, 
6798, and 6799) 16,316 
Firm-years with missing data from CRSP 30,170 
Firm-years with missing data on 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 from Compustat Quarterly 
Database 8,817 
Main Sample with Data Available for the 𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 Metric (1993-2012) 61,557 
 
Panel B. Industry Distribution 
Industry N % 
1 Consumer NonDurables  3,525 5.7 
2 Consumer Durables  1,603 2.6 
3 Manufacturing 6,980 11.3 
4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 2,096 3.4 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 1,549 2.5 
6 Business Equipment 9,164 14.9 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 1,110 1.8 
8 Utilities 2,273 3.7 
9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 6,798 11.0 
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 4,051 6.6 
11 Finance 15,177 24.7 
12 Other  7,231 11.8 
Total firm-years 61,557 100.0 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Distribution by Year 



























































































































      
61,557   100.0 
 
This table presents sample selection and distribution for my study. Panel A presents the 
sample selection; Panel B presents the industry distribution (defined using the Fama and 
French (1997) 12 industry classification); and Panel C presents the annual distribution. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 Metric 
 
Panel A. Annual ETR Estimates and the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 Metric 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Q1_Annual_ETR 0.338 0.104 0.311 0.360 0.390 
Q2_Annual_ETR 0.337 0.103 0.308 0.359 0.390 
Q3_Annual_ETR 0.335 0.106 0.302 0.356 0.389 
Q4_Annual_ETR 0.333 0.116 0.293 0.352 0.388 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  0.329 1.043 0.015 0.048 0.172 
 





N %   N % 
Monotonically Increasing (MI) 5,054 10.5 
 
280 4.0 
Monotonically Decreasing (MD) 8,438 17.5 
 
382 5.5 
Fluctuating (FL) 34,763 72.0 
 
6,341 90.5 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 














































































































































Panel D. Descriptive Statistics of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 by Intra-year ETR Trend 
Trend Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
MI 0.129 0.268 0.016 0.049 0.141 
MD 0.259 0.844 0.022 0.054 0.153 
FL 0.160 0.563 0.012 0.036 0.110 
 
Panel E. Test of Difference in 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 by Intra-year ETR Trend 
Difference MI vs. MD   MI vs. FL   MD vs. FL 
Mean Diff -0.130*** 
 
-0.031*** 0.099*** 










Median Test p-Value 0.000   0.000   0.000 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel F. Persistence of ETR Miss 
 
Prior One Year 
 
Prior Two Years 
Variable Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.190*** (43.78) 
 
0.154*** (34.45) 









N 46,900   36,811 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric. 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for annual ETR estimated at different time of the 
year (three estimates on interim dates and one estimate at the year-end) and the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 
metric.  
 
Panel B presents sample distribution by intra-year ETR trend, with data available for 
expected annual ETR at the end of all four quarters (totaling 48,255 firm-years). The first 
two columns show the distribution for firm-years; the next two columns show the 
distribution for unique firms. Three intra-year ETR trends are presented: (i) 
monotonically increasing (MI); (ii) monotonically decreasing (MD); and (iii) fluctuating 
(FL). For firm-year distribution, the MI group consists of firm-years with Q1 Annual 
ETR < Q2 Annual ETR < Q3 Annual ETR < Q4 Annual ETR; the MD group consists of 
firm-years with Q1 Annual ETR > Q2 Annual ETR > Q3 Annual ETR > Q4 Annual 
ETR; and the FL group consists of firm-years that do not fall into the other two groups. 
For firm distribution, the MI group consists of firms with the majority of years falling 
into MI; the MD group consists of firms with the majority of years falling into MD; and 
the FL group consists of firms with the majority of years falling into FL; firms who do 
not have the majority of years falling into any of the three groups are excluded from the 
firm distribution. 
 
Panel C presents the frequency distribution of repeated firm behaviors under each of the 
three intra-year ETR trends: MI, MD, and FL, where the intra-year trends are defined for 
firm-years. The number of repeated behaviors (under the heading “No.”) is the maximum 
number of years the same firm falls into a given intra-year ETR trend during my sample 
period of 1993-2012. The frequency distribution (under the heading “N”) is the number 
of firms exhibiting the corresponding maximum number of repeated behaviors in my 
sample. The number of repeated behaviors times the frequency distribution adds up to the 
total firm-years under each trend presented in Panel B. 
 
Panel D presents descriptive statistics for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric by intra-year ETR trend: 
MI, MD, and FL, where the intra-year trends are defined for firm-years. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel E presents tests in difference for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric between the three intra-year 
ETR trends: MI, MD, and FL, where the intra-year trends are defined for firm-years. The 
first two rows present results for difference in means; the next two rows present results 
for difference in medians. 
 
Panel F presents the persistence of ETR Miss. The first two columns show the persistence 
on one-year-back ETR Miss, for which the sample period is 1994-2012; the next two 
columns show the persistence on both one-year-back and two-years-back ETR Miss, for 
which the sample period is 1995-2012. The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS 
regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in 
parentheses. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Determinants of ETR Miss 
 
Panel A. Reconciliation of Sample Selection 
 Firm-years in the main sample 61,557 
Less firm-years lacking data on: 
 Internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) or auditor provided tax service (𝐴𝑇𝑆) 34,878 
Tax Aggressiveness (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔) 3,553 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔) 2,973 
Institutional holding (𝐺𝑜𝑣) 3,044 
Other Regression Variables 4 
Final Sample for Testing Determinants of ETR Miss (2002-2012) 17,105 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics (N = 17,105) 
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   25%   Median   75% 
Outcome Variable 












































































































Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Correlations (N = 17,105) 
  𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  𝐺𝑜𝑣  𝐴𝑇𝑆  𝐼𝐶𝑊  𝑅𝐸𝑆  𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  1 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.18*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.02** 0.09*** 0.05*** -0.10*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  0.03*** 1 0.10*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.09*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.17*** 
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  0.08*** 0.04*** 1 0.15*** 0.23*** -0.10*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.05*** 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  0.09*** -0.01* 0.15*** 1 0.41*** -0.03*** 0.31*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.04*** -0.02** 0.03*** 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  0.16*** -0.02** 0.17*** 0.30*** 1 0.05*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.05*** -0.02** 0.27*** 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.00 0.03*** 1 -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.02** 0.03*** 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.04*** 0.02** 0.05*** 0.18*** 0.09*** -0.01 1 -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 -0.08*** 
𝐺𝑜𝑣  -0.05*** -0.02** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 1 0.14*** -0.00 -0.01* 0.50*** 
𝐴𝑇𝑆  -0.01 0.01 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.16*** 1 0.00 -0.01 0.23*** 
𝐼𝐶𝑊  0.07*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.02** -0.01 0.00 1 0.17*** -0.03*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑆  0.05*** 0.01 0.01* -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.17*** 1 -0.04*** 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  -0.08*** -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.04*** -0.00 0.56*** 0.23*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 1 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for determinants of ETR Miss. 
 
Panel A reconciles the main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric: 61,557 firm-year observations over 1993-
2012) to the sample for testing determinants of ETR Miss (17,105 firm-year observations over 2002-2012). The main reason 
for the reduction in sample size is due to data limitations on internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) and auditor provided tax service 
(𝐴𝑇𝑆), which are available in Audit Analytics from 2002 and 2000, respectively. 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing determinants of ETR Miss (N = 17,105) over 2002-2012. 
Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Panel C presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations for the sample of 17,105 firm-year observations for testing determinants 
of ETR Miss below (above) the diagonal. *, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, based 
on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results: Determinants of ETR Miss 
 
  Panel A. 2002-2012   Panel B. 1993-2012 
Variable Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.732*** (11.34)   0.578*** (15.15) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  0.003** (2.36)   0.003*** (3.60) 
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  0.112*** (4.93)   0.134*** (8.28) 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  0.067** (2.21)   0.056*** (3.14) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  0.520*** (11.25)   0.451*** (13.69) 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.356*** (7.18)   0.290*** (9.79) 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.007 (1.02)   0.012** (2.13) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣  -0.001** (-2.46)   -0.001*** (-4.76) 
𝐴𝑇𝑆  -0.018 (-0.75)   
  𝐼𝐶𝑊  0.368*** (3.35)   
  𝑅𝐸𝑆  0.165*** (3.67)   0.166*** (4.20) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  -0.058*** (-8.17)   -0.051*** (-11.41) 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year   Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 6%   5% 
N 17,105   36,815 
 
This table presents results testing the determinants of ETR Miss. Panel A shows results 
for the full model, where the sample period is 2002-2012, because data on internal 
control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) is available in Audit Analytics from 2002. Panel B shows results 
for the abbreviated model, where the sample period is 1993-2012, as variables for 
internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) and auditor-provided tax services (𝐴𝑇𝑆, available in 
Audit Analytics from 2000) are removed from the model. 
 
Presented results on tax aggressiveness (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔) are the estimated results multiplied by 
negative one, because the proxy for tax aggressiveness in this table is cash effective tax 
rate (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅), with higher value indicating lower tax aggressiveness; while the 
interpretation is for higher tax aggressiveness and ETR Miss. Results on all other 
variables are as estimated. 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects 
(untabulated) are included in all estimations. Industry is defined using the Fama and 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
 
Panel A. Reconciliation of Sample Selection 
 Firm-years in the main sample 61,557 
Less firm-years lacking data on: 
 One year ahead pre-tax earnings (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1) 3,930 
Pre-tax cash flows (𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡) 336 
Final Sample for Testing Slack and Earnings Persistence (1993-2012) 57,291 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics (N = 57,291) 
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   25%   Median   75% 
Outcome Variable 





































𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  -0.02   0.08   -0.06   -0.02   0.02 
 
Panel C. Correlations (N = 57,291) 
  𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1  𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡+1  1 -0.18*** 0.68*** 0.59*** -0.16*** 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  -0.09*** 1 -0.21*** -0.13*** -0.06*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.61*** -0.09*** 1 0.72*** -0.05*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  0.55*** -0.07*** 0.72*** 1 -0.65*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  -0.08*** -0.01** 0.12*** -0.59*** 1 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings 
persistence. 
 
Panel A reconciles the main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric: 61,557 
firm-year observations over 1993-2012) to the sample for testing the consequence of ETR 
Miss on earnings persistence and the persistence of earnings components (57,291 firm-
year observations over 1993-2012). 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the 
consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence. Full variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations for variables used for testing the 
consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence below (above) the diagonal. *, **, *** 
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Table 6 
Regression Results: ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
 
Variable 
Panel A. Earnings 
Persistence   
Panel B. Persistence of 
Earnings Components 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Intercept 0.004*** 
 




(4.96)   (-3.85) 
 
(-3.28) 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.717*** 
 
0.733***   




(93.63)   
   𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  
  
0.002***   
  
0.000 
   
(3.33)   
  
(0.32) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  
  
-0.078***   
   
   
(-7.51)   
   𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
   
  0.737*** 
 
0.746*** 
    




   
  0.519*** 
 
0.536*** 
    
  (48.73) 
 
(48.79) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  








𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  










37%   39% 
 
40% 
N 57,291   57,291   57,291   57,291 
 
This table presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence. 
The sample period is 1993-2012.  
 
Panel A shows results for earnings persistence; Panel B shows results for the persistence 
of earnings components (i.e., the cash flows components and the accruals component). 
Columns (1) and (3) replicate the earnings persistence estimation used in prior studies; 
Columns (2) and (4) incorporate ETR Miss into the estimation for testing the 
consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence and the persistence of earnings 
components. 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. Full variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
 
Panel A. Reconciliation of Sample Selection 
 Firm-years in the main sample 61,557 
Less firm-years lacking data on: 
 Three month ahead stock price (𝑃) 505 
Earnings per share (𝐸) 72 
Book value per share (𝐵𝑉) 151 
Final Sample for Testing ETR Miss and Value Relevance (1993-2012) 60,829 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics (N = 60,829) 
Variable Mean   Std. Dev.   25%   Median   75% 
Outcome Variable 




























𝐵𝑉  11.53   9.15   5.14   9.35   15.34 
 
Panel C. Correlations (N = 60,829) 
  𝑃    𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠    𝐸    𝐵𝑉  





















𝐵𝑉  0.55***   -0.07***   0.71***   1 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the consequence of ETR Miss on value 
relevance. 
 
Panel A reconciles the main sample (with data available for the 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 metric: 61,557 
firm-year observations over 1993-2012) to the sample for testing the consequence of ETR 
Miss on the value relevance of accounting information (60,829 firm-year observations 
over 1993-2012). 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for variables used for testing the consequence of 
ETR Miss on the value relevance of accounting information (N = 60,829) over 1993-
2012. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel C presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations for variables used for testing the 
consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance of accounting information below 
(above) the diagonal. *, **, *** correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 8 
Regression Results: ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
 
Variable 
Panel A. Scaled Valuation 
Model 
Panel B. Unscaled Valuation 
Model 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Intercept 4.355*** 
 






(7.35)   (0.09) 
 
(0.07) 
𝐸  8.993*** 
 






(51.24)   (24.48) 
 
(24.83) 
𝐵𝑉  0.405*** 
 











-0.631***   
  
-26.536** 
   
(-6.84)   
  
(-2.27) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 ∗ 𝑬  
  
-1.168***   
  
-1.212*** 
   
(-13.41)   
  
(-5.34) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉  
  
0.148***   
  
0.168*** 
   
(13.19)   
  
(4.64) 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year   Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 53% 
 
53%   86% 
 
86% 
N 60,829   60,829   61,042   61,042 
 
This table presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance of 
accounting information. The sample period is 1993-2012. 
 
Panel A shows results for the scaled valuation model (where stock price, earnings, and 
book value are scaled by number of shares outstanding; that is, price per share, earnings 
per share, and book value per share are used); Panel B shows results for the unscaled 
valuation model (where total market value of equity, total earnings, and total book values 
are used). Columns (1) and (3) replicate the value relevance estimation used in prior 
studies; Columns (2) and (4) incorporate ETR Miss into the estimation for testing the 
consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance of accounting information. 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects 
(untabulated) are included in all estimations. Industry is defined using the Fama and 









Panel A. ETR Miss and the Persistence of Quarterly Earnings 
 
Earnings Persistence   
Persistence of Earnings 
Components 
Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Intercept 0.002*** 
 






(17.24)   (17.01) 
 
(19.01) 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.636*** 
 
0.653***   




(85.64)   
   𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  
  
-0.000***   
  
-0.000*** 
   
(-4.45)   
  
(-5.38) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  
  
-0.060***   
   
   
(-11.95)   
   𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
   
  0.617*** 
 
0.632*** 
    




   
  0.535*** 
 
0.554*** 
    
  (66.60) 
 
(69.73) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  








𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  










29%   27% 
 
28% 
N 204,311   204,311   204,311   204,311 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B. ETR Miss and the Value Relevance of Quarterly Earnings 
 
Scaled Valuation Model Unscaled Valuation Model 
Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Intercept 4.790*** 
 






(5.01)   (0.63) 
 
(0.65) 






(39.66)   (22.27) 
 
(22.48) 
𝐵𝑉  0.714*** 
 











-0.787***   
  
-50.286*** 
   
(-12.41)   
  
(-5.14) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 ∗ 𝑬  
  
-2.090***   
  
-3.225*** 
   
(-13.84)   
  
(-8.48) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉  
  
0.051***   
  
0.095*** 
   
(7.56)   
  
(4.40) 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year, Quarter   Industry, Year, Quarter 
Adjusted-R2 47% 
 
47%   84% 
 
84% 
N 204,311   204,311   204,309   204,309 
 
This table presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss using quarterly data. The 
sample period is 1993-2012.  
 
Panel A presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the persistence of 
quarterly earnings. Columns (1) and (2) show results for earnings persistence. Columns 
(3) and (4) show results for the persistence of earnings components (i.e., the cash flows 
component and the accruals component). The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS 
regression, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in 
parentheses. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Panel B presents results testing the consequence of ETR Miss on the value relevance of 
quarterly earnings. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the scaled valuation model 
(where stock price, earnings, and book value are scaled by number of shares outstanding; 
that is, price per share, earnings per share, and book value per share are used). Columns 
(3) and (4) show results for the unscaled valuation model (where total market value of 
equity, total earnings, and total book values are used). The estimation is conducted using 
pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics is 
shown in parentheses. Industry, year and quarter fixed effects (untabulated) are included 
in all estimations. Industry is defined using the Fama and French (1997) 12 Industry 






Robustness Check for Determinants of ETR Miss 
 
Panel A. Alternative Measures of Regression Variables 
 Outcome Variable Explanatory Variables 
Variable 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉  𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅 𝑈𝑇𝐵  𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐴𝐶  𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.906*** 0.567*** 0.924*** 0.899*** 0.732*** 0.727*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  0.003** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003 0.003** 0.003** 
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  0.114*** 0.062*** 0.103*** 0.137*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  0.071** 0.031** 0.050* 0.006 0.067** 0.069** 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  0.533*** 0.278*** 0.465*** 0.560*** 0.520*** 0.524*** 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.358*** 0.209*** 0.871*** 7.778*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.006 0.002 0.014** 0.006 0.007 0.007 
𝐺𝑜𝑣  -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
𝐴𝑇𝑆  -0.012 -0.010 -0.022 -0.001 -0.018 -0.017 
𝐼𝐶𝑊  0.382*** 0.125*** 0.261** 0.423** 0.368*** 0.163*** 
𝑅𝐸𝑆  0.161*** 0.081*** 0.157*** 0.125 0.165*** 0.159*** 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  -0.060*** -0.032*** -0.058*** -0.091*** -0.058*** -0.057*** 
Fixed 
Effects Industry, Year Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 6% 7% 8% 7% 6% 6% 






Table 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Sample Exclusion 
 
Full Model: 2002-2012 Abbreviated Model: 1993-2012 
Variable 


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.798*** 0.766*** 0.772*** 0.737*** 0.513*** 0.482*** 0.602*** 0.624*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  0.003 0.004* 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  0.129*** 0.140*** 0.122*** 0.111*** 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  0.087** 0.097** 0.077** 0.076** 0.040** 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  0.341*** 0.440*** 0.545*** 0.533*** 0.321*** 0.356*** 0.464*** 0.473*** 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.260*** 0.290*** 0.381*** 0.346*** 0.225*** 0.213*** 0.312*** 0.299*** 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.014 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.015* 0.011 0.012** 0.010* 
𝐺𝑜𝑣  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
𝐴𝑇𝑆  0.015 -0.003 -0.031 -0.009 
    𝐼𝐶𝑊  0.267* 0.311** 0.392*** 0.383*** 
    𝑅𝐸𝑆  0.020 0.024 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.026 0.043 0.185*** 0.182*** 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 5% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 6% 5% 







Table 10 (continued) 
 
This table presents robustness check for testing determinants of ETR Miss.  
 
Panel A shows results using alternative measures of regression variables. The sample period is 2002-2012. Columns (1) and 
(2) present results using alternative measures of outcome variable: Column (1) uses 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4 (which uses Q4 year-to-date 
ETR from Compustat Quarterly to replace year-end annual ETR from Compustat Annual for computation of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 as 
defined in Appendix A), and Column (2) uses 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 (which is the unadapted coefficient of variation of the four annual 
ETR estimates made during the year). Columns (3) to (6) present results using alternative measures of explanatory variables: 
Column (3) uses 𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅 as an alternative measure for 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔; Column (4) uses 𝑈𝑇𝐵 as an alternative measure for 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔 ; Column (5) uses 𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝑃𝑀𝐷𝐴𝐶  as an alternative measure for 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔 ; and Column (6) uses 𝐼𝐶𝑊_𝐺𝑒𝑛  as an 
alternative measure for 𝐼𝐶𝑊. 
 
Panel B shows results after alternative sample exclusions. The first four columns show results from the full model, where the 
sample period is 2002-2012, because data on internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) is available in Audit Analytics from 2002. The 
next four columns show results from the abbreviated model, where the sample period is 1993-2012, as variables for internal 
control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) and auditor-provided tax services (𝐴𝑇𝑆, available in Audit Analytics from 2000) are removed from 
the model. Columns (1) and (5) present results after sample exclusion for special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat 
data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼); Columns (2) and (6) present results after sample exclusion for special items from Compustat Quarterly 
(Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄); Columns (3) and (7) present results after sample exclusion for all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; and Columns (4) and (8) present results after sample exclusion for firm-years with different Q4 
year-to-date ETR (from Compustat Quarterly) and year-end annual ETR (from Compustat Annual). 
 
For both Panel A and Panel B, except for the 𝑈𝑇𝐵  measure (in Column 4 of Panel A), all presented results on tax 
aggressiveness (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔) are the estimated results multiplied by negative one, because the proxy for tax aggressiveness in the 
main specification is cash effective tax rate (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅, used in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Panel A, and all Columns of 
Panel B), with higher value indicating lower tax aggressiveness; while the interpretation is for higher tax aggressiveness and 
ETR Miss. Similarly, the alternative measure using GAAP effective tax rate (𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅, in Column 3 of Panel A) has a 
similar interpretation, and its presented result is also the estimated result multiplied by negative one. Result on 𝑈𝑇𝐵 is as 






Table 10 (continued) 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** 
correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Industry and year fixed effects (untabulated) are included 
in all estimations. Industry is defined using the Fama and French (1997) 12 Industry Classification. Full variable definitions are 







Robustness Check for ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
 
Panel A. Alternative Measures of Regression Variables 
Variable 
Earnings Persistence   Persistence of Earnings Components 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉  𝑂𝐼    𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉  𝑂𝐼  
 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.007***   -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.008*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.728*** 0.743*** 0.800***   
   𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  0.002*** 0.006*** 0.001***   0.001 0.000 0.001** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  -0.075*** -0.200*** -0.036***   
   𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
   
  0.739*** 0.747*** 0.779*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  
   
  0.525*** 0.550*** 0.675*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  
   
  -0.052*** -0.127*** -0.037*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  
   
  -0.053*** -0.165*** -0.028*** 
Adjusted-R2 37% 38% 55%   39% 40% 55% 







Table 11 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Sample Exclusion 
Variable 
Earnings Persistence Persistence of Earnings Components 


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.001 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.008*** -0.002*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.760*** 0.758*** 0.732*** 0.730*** 
    𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  0.000 0.001 0.002** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  -0.059*** -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.079*** 
    𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
    
0.758*** 0.759*** 0.773*** 0.741*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  
    
0.571*** 0.567*** 0.545*** 0.529*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  
    
-0.043*** -0.030*** -0.052*** -0.054*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  
    
-0.044*** -0.032** -0.055*** -0.054*** 
Adjusted-R2 44% 43% 31% 38% 44% 44% 34% 40% 







Table 11 (continued) 
 
This table presents robustness check for testing the consequence of ETR Miss on earnings persistence. The sample period is 
1993-2012. 
 
Panel A shows results using alternative measures of regression variables. The first three columns show results for earnings 
persistence; the next three columns show results for the persistence of earnings components. Columns (1) and (4) present 
results using 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4 (which uses Q4 year-to-date ETR from Compustat Quarterly to replace year-end annual ETR from 
Compustat Annual for computation of 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 as defined in Appendix A) as an alternative measure for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠; Columns 
(2) and (5) present results using 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 (which is the unadapted coefficient of variation of the four annual ETR estimates 
made during the year) as an alternative measure for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠; and Columns (3) and (6) present results using operating income 
and operating accruals as alternative measures for pre-tax earnings and earnings components. 
 
Panel B shows results after alternative sample exclusions. The first four columns show results for earnings persistence; the 
next four columns show results for the persistence of earnings components. Columns (1) and (5) present results after sample 
exclusion for special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼); Columns (2) and (6) present results after 
sample exclusion for special items from Compustat Quarterly (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄); Columns (3) and (7) present results 
after sample exclusion for all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; and Columns (4) and (8) present 
results after sample exclusion for firm-years with different Q4 year-to-date ETR (from Compustat Quarterly) and year-end 
annual ETR (from Compustat Annual). 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** 
correspond to significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 12 
Robustness Check for ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
 
















































N   53,851   53,825 
 
Panel B. Sample Exclusion 
Variable 
Regression Results after Sample Exclusion for: 




Financial and  
Utilities 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 3.481*** 4.013*** 4.259*** 2.936*** 
𝐸  10.563*** 10.365*** 9.377*** 9.682*** 
𝐵𝑉  0.153*** 0.183*** 0.414*** 0.314*** 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  -0.850*** -0.703*** -0.553*** -0.653*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 ∗ 𝑬  -1.382*** -1.409*** -1.140*** -1.204*** 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉  0.168*** 0.179*** 0.140*** 0.155*** 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 53% 52% 54% 54% 
N 34,058 35,373 43,208 48,732 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Two-Stage Estimation: Discretionary ETR Miss 
Variable Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept -1.188 (-1.09) 
𝐸  8.651*** (34.91) 
𝐵𝑉  0.464*** (12.98) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  -0.183 (-1.50) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 ∗ 𝑬  -0.886*** (-6.23) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉  0.112*** (7.11) 




This table presents robustness check for testing the consequence of ETR Miss on value 
relevance, using the scaled valuation model. The sample period is 1993-2012. 
 
Panel A shows results using alternative measures of regression variables. Columns (1) 
presents results using 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝑄4  (which uses Q4 year-to-date ETR from Compustat 
Quarterly to replace year-end annual ETR from Compustat Annual for computation of 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 as defined in Appendix A) as an alternative measure for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠; Columns 
(2) presents results using 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠_𝐶𝑉 (which is the unadapted coefficient of variation of the 
four annual ETR estimates made during the year) as an alternative measure for 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠. 
 
Panel B shows results after alternative sample exclusions. Column (1) presents results 
after sample exclusion for special items from Compustat Annual (Compustat data item 
𝑆𝑃𝐼 ); Column (2) presents results after sample exclusion for special items from 
Compustat Quarterly (Compustat data item 𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑄 ); Column (3) presents results after 
sample exclusion for all financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) firms; 
and Column (4) presents results after sample exclusion for firm-years with different Q4 
year-to-date ETR (from Compustat Quarterly) and year-end annual ETR (from 
Compustat Annual). 
 
Panel C shows results from two-stage estimation, where discretionary ETR Miss is tested 
in the second stage instead of total ETR Miss. Discretionary ETR Miss is estimated as the 
residual value from the first stage model, where ETR Miss is modeled as a function of its 
determinants specified in Equation (1).  
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** correspond to significance 
levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Industry and year fixed effects (untabulated) 
are included in all estimations. Industry is defined using the Fama and French (1997) 12 
Industry Classification. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 13 
Robustness Check Using Alternative Sample Period 
 




































































N   20,204   16,611 
 
Panel B. Alternative Sample Period for Testing ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
Variable 
Earnings Persistence 
Persistence of Earnings 
Components 
1993-2002 2003-2012 1993-2002 2003-2012 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.705*** 0.773*** 
  𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  0.000 0.003*** -0.002 0.002** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  -0.060*** -0.096*** 
  𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
 
  0.725*** 0.776*** 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  
 
  0.511*** 0.587*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  
 
  -0.034** -0.073*** 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  
 
  -0.047*** -0.075*** 
Adjusted-R2 34% 44% 36% 45% 





  90 
Table 13 (continued) 
 
















































N   35,084   25,745 
 
This table presents robustness check using alternative sample period, where separate tests 
are conducted for the first half of the sample period (1993-2002) and the second half of 
the sample period (2003-2012). 
 
Panel A shows results using alternative sample period for testing determinants of ETR 
Miss. To ensure comparability across the two sample periods, results are estimated with 
the abbreviated model, which removes two variables that are only available in the later 
part of the sample period: (i) internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊, available from 2002); and 
(ii) auditor-provided tax services (𝐴𝑇𝑆, available from 2000). Column (1) presents results 
for the sample period 1993-2002; Column (2) presents results for the sample period 
2003-2012. Results on tax aggressiveness (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔) are the estimated results multiplied 
by negative one, because the proxy for tax aggressiveness in this table is cash effective 
tax rate (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅), with higher value indicating lower tax aggressiveness; while the 
interpretation is for higher tax aggressiveness and ETR Miss. Results on all other 
variables are as estimated. 
 
Panel B shows results using alternative sample period for testing ETR Miss and earnings 
persistence. The first two columns show results for earnings persistence; the next two 
columns show results for the persistence of earnings components. Columns (1) and (3) 
present results for the sample period 1993-2002; Columns (2) and (4) present results for 
the sample period 2003-2012. 
 
Panel C shows results using alternative sample period for testing ETR Miss and value 
relevance, estimated with the scaled valuation model. Column (1) presents results for the 
sample period 1993-2002; Column (2) presents results for the sample period 2003-2012. 
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Table 13 (continued) 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** correspond to significance 
levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Industry and year fixed effects (untabulated) 
are included for estimations in Panel A and Panel C. Industry is defined using the Fama 
and French (1997) 12 Industry Classification. Full variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 14 
Robustness Check Using Alternative Sample Selection 
 










Intercept 0.301*** (13.90) 
 
0.301*** (10.70) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑃𝐷  0.001*** (2.83) 
 
0.001*** (4.60) 
𝑇𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  0.035*** (4.67) 
 
0.046*** (7.87) 
𝑅𝐷𝐶𝑅  0.042*** (4.55) 
 
0.024*** (3.87) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  0.176*** (11.87) 
 
0.164*** (14.71) 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.138*** (7.82) 
 
0.147*** (12.24) 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔  0.003 (1.48) 
 
0.005** (2.44) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣  -0.001*** (-5.67) 
 
-0.001*** (-8.39) 
𝐴𝑇𝑆  0.010 (1.32) 
   𝐼𝐶𝑊  0.110*** (3.36) 
   𝑅𝐸𝑆  0.019 (1.41) 
 
0.027** (2.41) 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸  -0.017*** (-6.42) 
 
-0.018*** (-9.89) 






N 14,996   28,966 
 
Panel B. Alternative Sample Selection for Testing ETR Miss and Earnings Persistence 
Variable 
Earnings Persistence 
Persistence of Earnings 
Components 
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
 
(1) (2) 
Intercept 0.002*** (3.46) -0.001 (-1.25) 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑡  0.764*** (95.07) 
  𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡  0.003 (1.18) -0.004 (-1.63) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑩𝑰𝒕  -0.245*** (-7.95) 
  𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑡  
 
  0.757*** (95.83) 
𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡  
 
  0.570*** (45.17) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑪𝑭𝒕  
 
  -0.160*** (-5.76) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕  
 
  -0.142*** (-4.33) 
Adjusted-R2 43% 44% 
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
Panel C. Alternative Sample Selection for Testing ETR Miss and Value Relevance 
  
Scaled Valuation Model   Unscaled Valuation Model 
Variable   Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat. 
  
(1)   (2) 
Intercept 
 
3.786*** (3.63)   -68.737 (-0.37) 
𝐸  
 
10.212*** (48.33)   13.860*** (26.46) 
𝐵𝑉  
 
0.226*** (7.62)   0.444*** (4.71) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠  
 
-3.308*** (-9.23)   -182.585*** (-3.98) 
𝑬𝑻𝑹𝑴𝒊𝒔𝒔 ∗ 𝑬  
 
-3.897*** (-10.93)   -5.125*** (-4.92) 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐵𝑉  
 
0.579*** (12.15)   0.912*** (5.40) 
Fixed Effects 
 
Industry, Year   Industry, Year 
Adjusted-R2 
 
55%   86% 
N   47,808   47,960 
 
This table presents robustness check using alternative sample selection criteria. In 
particular, data on annual ETR estimates are required for all three interim dates (i.e., Q1, 
Q2, and Q3) for a firm-year to be included in the sample. The sample period is 1993-
2012. 
 
Panel A shows results using alternative sample selection for testing determinants of ETR 
Miss. Column (1) presents results from the full model, where the sample period is 2002-
2012, because data on internal control weakness (𝐼𝐶𝑊) is available in Audit Analytics 
from 2002. Column (2) presents results from the abbreviated model, where the sample 
period is 1993-2012, as variables for internal control weakness ( 𝐼𝐶𝑊 ) and auditor-
provided tax services (𝐴𝑇𝑆, available in Audit Analytics from 2000) are removed from 
the model. Results on tax aggressiveness (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑔) are the estimated results multiplied 
by negative one, because the proxy for tax aggressiveness in this table is cash effective 
tax rate (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐸𝑇𝑅3𝑌𝑅), with higher value indicating lower tax aggressiveness; while the 
interpretation is for higher tax aggressiveness and ETR Miss. Results on all other 
variables are as estimated. 
 
Panel B shows results using alternative sample selection for testing ETR Miss and 
earnings persistence. Column (1) presents results for earnings persistence; Column (2) 
presents results for the persistence of earnings components.  
 
Panel C shows results using alternative sample selection for testing ETR Miss and value 
relevance. Column (1) presents results for the scaled valuation model (where stock price, 
earnings, and book value are scaled by number of shares outstanding; that is, price per 
share, earnings per share, and book value per share are used); Column (2) presents results 
for the unscaled valuation model (where total market value of equity, total earnings, and 
total book values are used). 
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
The estimation is conducted using pooled OLS regression, with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics is shown in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects 
(untabulated) are included for estimations in Panel A and Panel C. Industry is defined 
using the Fama and French (1997) 12 Industry Classification. Full variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. 
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